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Commodity futures risk premiums vary across commodities and over time depending on the level
of physical inventories, as predicted by the Theory of Storage. Using a comprehensive dataset on 31
commodity futures and physical inventories between 1969 and 2006, we show that the convenience
yield is a decreasing, non-linear relationship of inventories. Price measures, such as the futures basis,
prior futures returns, and spot returns reflect the state of inventories and are informative about commodity
futures risk premiums. The excess returns to Spot and Futures Momentum and Backwardation strategies
stem in part from the selection of commodities when inventories are low. Positions of futures markets
participants are correlated with prices and inventory signals, but we reject the Keynesian "hedging
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we analyze the fundamentals of commodity futures risk premiums. We show that 
time-series  variation  and  cross-sectional  variation  in  commodity  futures  risk  premiums  are 
determined by the level of inventories of the commodity in the economy. The starting point of our 
analysis is the traditional Theory of Storage. Originally proposed by Kaldor (1939), the theory 
provides  a  link  between  the  term  structure  of  futures  prices  and  the  level  of  inventories  of 
commodities. This link, also known as “cost of carry arbitrage,” predicts that in order to induce 
storage, futures prices and expected spot prices of commodities have to rise sufficiently over time 
to compensate inventory holders for the costs associated with storage. 
In addition to market expectations of future spot prices, futures prices potentially embed a 
risk premium that is a compensation for insurance against future spot price risk. Whether futures 
prices  also  embed  risk  premiums  has  been  more  controversial  in  the  literature.  In  part,  this 
controversy stems from the difficulty in detecting risk premiums in volatile markets using small 
samples, and the lack of correlation of commodity futures returns with conventional measures of 
systematic risk suggested in the asset pricing literature.  
To formalize the link between futures prices and risk premiums, we start by presenting a 
simple  theoretical  extension  of  the  theory  of  inventory  behavior  developed  by  Deaton  and 
Laroque (DL 1992), and Routledge, Seppi and Spatt (RSS, 2000). Their models predict a link 
between the level of inventories and future spot price volatility. Inventories act as buffer stocks 
which can be used to absorb shocks to demand and supply, thus dampening the impact on spot 
prices. DL show that at low inventory levels, the risk of a “stock-out” (exhaustion of inventories) 
increases and expected future spot price volatility rises. In an extension of the DL model which 
includes a futures market, RSS show how the shape of the futures curve reflects the state of 
inventories and signals expectations about future spot price volatility. DL (1992) and RSS (2000) 
have explained the existence of a convenience yield as arising from the probability of a stock-out 
of inventories.  Because they study storage in a risk-neutral world, risk premiums are zero by 
construction, and futures prices simply reflect expectations about future spot prices.  
To allow for a link between inventories and futures risk premiums, we extend the DL 
model to include risk-averse agents and a hedging motive on behalf of producers. Our model 
predicts a link between the state of inventories, the shape of the futures curve, and expected 
futures risk premiums. Given that futures contracts provide insurance against price volatility, the 
level of inventories is negatively related to the required risk premium of commodity futures. The 
main contribution of our paper is to provide an empirical test of these predictions.    2 
Despite the long history of the traditional Theory of Storage, surprisingly few researchers 
have  attempted  to  directly  test  the  theory  using  inventory  data.
1 Often  cited  reasons  include 
problems related to the availability and the poor quality of inventory data, and issues regarding 
the  appropriate  definition  of  relevant  inventories.  Most  tests  of  the  Theory  of  Storage  have 
focused instead on testing predictions about the (relative) volatility of spot and futures prices.  
The first contribution of this paper is to present monthly measures of inventories for a 
large cross-section of 31 commodities between 1969 and 2006, and show that these measures of 
inventories are reflected in the shape of the futures curve as predicted by the Theory of Storage. 
As with much of the previous literature our initial focus is on the basis, the difference between 
the current spot commodity price and the current (nearest to maturity) futures price (expressed as 
a percentage of the spot price).
2 We link the basis to the level of inventories, and empirically 
document the nonlinear relationship predicted by the existence of the non-negativity constraint on 
inventories. In particular, low inventory levels for a commodity are associated with an inverted 
(“backwardated”) term structure of futures prices, while high levels of inventories are associated 
with an upward sloping futures curve (“contango”). In addition, we show that the relationship 
between inventories and the shape of the futures curve is non-linear: the slope of the futures curve 
becomes steeper as inventories decline. 
The  second  contribution  of  the  paper  is  to  document  an  empirical  link  between 
inventories and risk premiums. We present two sets of tests to examine whether inventory levels 
are negatively associated with risk premiums on commodity futures. The first set of tests uses 
inventories directly as explanatory variables for risk premiums. In addition to simple regression 
based  evidence,  we  show  that  sorting  commodity  futures  into  portfolios  based  on  inventory 
measures  is  correlated  with  future  average  returns.  While  a  direct  test  of  the  theory,  the 
interpretation  of  these  findings  is  complicated  by  an  unknown  timing  lag  in  the  information 
release of inventories data, and subsequent data revisions. The second set of tests uses price- 
based signals to proxy for inventories. We first show that the futures basis, prior futures returns, 
and prior spot price changes are correlated with current inventory levels. Next, we show that 
these price-based measures of inventories are informative about the expected returns of portfolios 
sorted on these measures. Inspection of the inventory characteristics of these sorted portfolios 
confirms  that  the  risk  premiums  carry  a  common  component,  earned  in  part  by  investing  in 
                                                 
1 Exceptions include Dincerler, Khokher and Titman (2003), and Dincerler, Khokher and Simin (2004). 
The former paper examines the effect of Storage on Natural Gas futures returns between 1994 and 2001; 
the latter paper examines the role of inventories and hedging pressure for risk premiums in futures of Gold, 
Copper, Crude Oil, and Natural Gas between 1995 and 2004.   
2 The “spot price” is usually taken to mean the nearest future contract (i.e., the contract that is closest to 
maturity) and the “futures price” means the next nearest futures contract.   3 
commodities in low inventory states. The returns earned on “momentum” and “backwardation” 
strategies can therefore be interpreted as compensation earned for bearing risk during times when 
inventories are low. 
Finally,  we  characterize  the  behavior  of  market  participants  in  futures  markets  in 
response  to  changes  in  inventories.  This  is  of  interest  because  much  of  the  literature  on 
commodity futures has assigned an important role to the behavior of market participants in setting 
risk premiums. For example, in the Theory of Normal Backwardation, Keynes (1930) conjectured 
that the long side of a commodity futures contract would receive a risk premium due to hedging 
demand  by  producers.  And  in  empirical  implementations  of  the  Theory  of  Normal 
Backwardation, researchers have linked “hedging pressure” to variation in futures risk premiums 
(e.g., Carter et al (1983), Bessembinder (1992), De Roon et al (2000)). Using data obtained from 
the Report of Traders released by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we show that 
positions  of  traders  are  contemporaneously  correlated  with  inventories  and  futures  prices. 
However, we find no evidence that these positions are correlated with ex-ante risk premiums of 
commodity  futures.  We  therefore  reject  the  hedging  pressure  hypothesis  as  an  alternative 
explanation for the variation of risk premiums documented in our empirical work. 
Our  research  builds  on  two  strands  of  literature.  The  first  starts  with  the  traditional 
Theory of Storage developed by Kaldor (1939), Working (1949), and Brennan (1958), which 
explained the futures prices in terms of the cost of storage, interest rates, and a convenience yield. 
The convenience yield was the answer to explain why inventory holders would hold inventories 
during periods of expected decline of spot prices. Tests of the Theory of Storage include Fama 
and  French  (1988)  and  Ng  and  Pirrong  (1994),  among  others.  Both  papers  use  the  interest-
adjusted basis as a proxy for inventories and examine the relation between the futures basis and 
price volatility. Fama and French (1988) analyze daily futures prices of metals over the period 
1972 to 1983. Without inventory data, they use two proxies for determining when inventories are 
low. One proxy is the sign of the interest-adjusted basis. The second proxy is the phase of the 
business  cycle.  Fama  and  French  (1988)  argue  that  inventories  are  relatively  low  during 
recessions. With these proxies for inventory levels, they test their hypothesis that futures prices 
are less variable than spot prices when inventory is low, an implication of the Theory of Storage, 
according to French (1987). Ng and Pirrong (1994) study four industrial metals. Like Fama and 
French (1988) they use the adjusted basis as a summary of supply and demand conditions and do 
not  use  inventory  data.  They  examine  the  marginal  impact  of  the  basis  (the  “spread”)  on 
variances, correlations, and elasticities of spot and futures. Their evidence is consistent with a 
concave, increasing relation between the adjusted spreads and inventories for spot and future   4 
return volatilities. Our contribution to this literature is that we directly examine the relationship 
between the basis and inventories using a large cross-section of commodities. In addition, our 
sample covers a longer span of time than previous research. 
The second strand of literature primarily focuses on variation of risk premiums. Fama and 
French (1987) study 21 commodity futures using monthly data, over various periods, all ending in 
July 1984 and starting as early as March 1966.  They examine both the variation in the futures 
basis and the information content in the basis about futures risk premiums. They find evidence 
that  the  basis  varies  with  interest  rates  and  seasonals  (a  proxy  for  convenience  yields,  since 
inventories are higher just after the harvest for agricultural commodities).  They also decompose 
changes in the basis into the change in the expected spot price and the risk premium and conclude 
that most of the information in the basis concerns expected future spot price movements. Nash 
(2001), Erb and Harvey (2006), and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) provide recent evidence of a 
relationship  between  the  futures  basis  and  futures  risk  premiums.  Momentum  in  commodity 
futures  has  been  documented  by  Pirrong  (2005),  Erb  and  Harvey  (2006),  Miffre  and  Rallis 
(2007), and Shen, Szakmary, and Sharma (2007). Chang (1985), Bessembinder (1992) and De 
Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000), Dincerler, Khokher and Titman (2003) and Dincerler, Khokher 
and Simin (2004) provide empirical evidence that traders’ positions are correlated with expected 
futures returns. Our contribution relative to these papers is to explain the relation between the 
returns and commodity characteristics as arising from fundamental variation in inventories as 
predicted by the Theory of Storage. And we show that expected futures returns are driven by 
inventories, instead of positions of traders.  
In addition to these papers, there is a large literature about unconditional risk premiums 
in commodity futures markets. Attempts to empirically measure the risk premium on individual 
commodity futures have yielded mixed results (see, for example, Bessembinder (1992), Kolb 
(1992), and Erb and Harvey (2006)). Most of these studies use small samples in both the time 
series and cross sectional dimensions. Looking at portfolios of commodity futures returns has 
produced  different  results.  Bodie  and Rosansky  (1980),  and  Gorton  and  Rouwenhorst  (2005, 
2006)  provide  empirical  evidence  that,  consistent  with  Keynes’  and  Hicks’  prediction,  long 
investors in commodity futures have historically earned a positive risk premium. The issue of 
reconciling commodity risk premiums with received asset pricing theory has generally been met 
with limited success (see, for example, Dusak (1973), Jagannathan (1985)). The current paper 
sheds  little  light  on  this  debate,  other  than  to  suggest  that  one  avenue  to  look  for  a  unified 
explanation of risk premiums is to consider systematic components of risk that are correlated with 
variation of inventories.    5 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  examine  the 
relationship between inventories and futures prices in more detail. We summarize the model in 
this section.  The model itself is formalized in Appendix A.  Section 3 presents our data and some 
stylized facts. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on the link between futures prices and 
inventories,  and  provides  evidence  that  the  state  of  inventories  is  correlated  with  expected 
commodity futures risk premiums. In Section 5 we analyze the returns to price-based commodity 
selection strategies, linking these price-based signals to time-series and cross-sectional variation 
in  commodity  risk  premiums.  In  Section  6  we  characterize  the  behavior  of  futures  markets 
participants depending on the state of inventories.  The final section summarizes our results and 
suggests some possible avenues for future research. 
 
2. The Theory of Storage and Commodity Futures 
 
In this section we briefly review some of the existing theories and outline our theoretical model 
and its testable hypotheses. For brevity, our theoretical model is contained in Appendix A.  
An upward sloping futures curve is consistent with an expected future spot price that 
rewards inventory holders for the cost of carrying inventories, including marginal warehousing 
costs, insurance, and the interest foregone on the capital invested in the inventories.  This link 
between the futures price and the expected future spot price is known as “cost-of-carry” arbitrage.  
The cost-of-carry argument has difficulty explaining downward sloping futures curves. That is, 
researchers recognized early on that this argument cannot rationally explain why inventory is held 
when there is a predictable decline in spot prices, when futures prices fall below spot prices – i.e., 
agricultural products are held over the harvest period when prices predictably fall. To reconcile 
spot  prices  at  levels  above  futures  prices  Kaldor  (1939)  postulated  the  existence  of  a 
“convenience yield” that holders of physical commodities earn but which does not accrue to 
holders of futures. This became known as the Theory of Storage. 
This Theory of Storage (see, Kaldor (1939), Working (1949), and Brennan (1958)) can be 
stated in terms of the basis, the difference between the contemporaneous spot price in period t, St, 
and the futures price (as of date t) for delivery at date T, Ft,T  It views the (negative of) the basis as 
consisting of the cost-of-carry: interest foregone to borrow to buy the commodity, St rt,(where rt is 
the  interest  charge  on  a  dollar  from  t  to  T),  plus  the  marginal  storage  costs  wt,  minus  a 
“convenience yield,” ct: 
 
t t t t t T t c w r S S F - + = - , .      (1)   6 
 
Equation  (1)  is  often  rationalized  as  following  from  the  absence  of  arbitrage.  Because  the 
convenience  yield  is  unobservable,  an  alternative  view  of  equation  (1)  is  merely  that  of  a 
definition  of  the  convenience  yield.    Economic  content  for  equation  (1)  is  provided  by  the 
assertion that the convenience yield, which is the basis adjusted for interest charges and storage 
costs, falls at a decreasing rate as aggregate inventory rises.  
The Theory of Storage derives a relationship between contemporaneous spot and futures 
prices.  Another  view  of  commodity  futures  is  the  Theory  of  Normal  Backwardation,  which 
compares  futures  prices  to  expected  future  spot  prices.  As  pointed  out  by  Fama  and  French 
(1988), these views are not mutually exclusive. The Theory of Normal Backwardation views 
futures markets as a risk transfer mechanism whereby long (risk-averse) investors earn a risk 
premium for bearing future spot risk that commodity producers want to hedge. This theory builds 
on the view that the basis consists of two components: a risk premium, πt,T, and the expected 
appreciation or depreciation of the future spot price: 
 
[ ] T t t T t t T t S S S F , , ) ( E p - - = - ,    (2) 
 
where πt,T ≡ Et(ST) – Ft,T . Equation (2) merely defines the risk premium. According to Keynes πt,T 
> 0,  which implies that the futures price is set at a discount (i.e., is “backwardated”) to the 
expected future spot price at date T, the date the futures contract expires. Keynes and Hicks 
(1939) view the risk premium as the outcome of the supply and demand for long and short 
positions in the futures markets (“hedging pressure”).  If hedging demand exceeds the supply of 
long  investors,  the  risk  premium  will  be  positive.    The  content  of  the  Theory  of  Normal 
Backwardation therefore comes from the assertion that hedgers are on net short and offer a risk 
premium to long investors, who are risk averse.  
Since  the  Theory  of  Storage  and  the  Theory  of  Normal  Backwardation  were  first 
articulated, a large theoretical literature has developed.
3 Our starting point is the modern version 
of the Theory of Storage due to Deaton and Laroque (1992, henceforth DL). 
4 Their goal is to 
explain  the  behavior  of  observed  spot  commodity  prices,  which  display  high  volatility,  high 
positive skewness, and significant kurtosis. Commodity prices show infrequent upward spikes, 
                                                 
3 The literature on commodity futures is vast, and we make no attempt at a comprehensive survey. Reviews 
of the literature are provided by Carter (1999), Kamara (1982), and Gray and Rutledge (1971), among 
others.  Telser (2000) provides an overview of the early literature. 
4 See also Williams and Wright (1991).   7 
but no downward spikes. In their model commodity prices, in the absence of any inventories, 
would be i.i.d. because “harvests” of commodities are i.i.d. These price dynamics are changed 
fundamentally when inventories are present.  Inventories cannot be negative (goods cannot be 
transferred from the future to the past), so there is a non-negativity constraint on inventories, 
which  “introduces  an  essential  non-linearity  which  carries  through  into  non-linearity  of  the 
predicted commodity price series” (DL, p. 1). 
DL do not model futures markets. RSS introduce a futures market into the DL model and 
show how the “convenience yield” arises endogenously as a function of the inventory level and 
the shock (“harvests”) affecting supply and demand of the commodity.  The convenience yield – 
the benefit accruing to the physical owners of a commodity – arises from the non-negativity 
constraint on inventories, which creates an option for the inventory holder of selling commodities 
in the spot market when inventories are low. 
In the DL and RSS models agents are risk-neutral. Hence, the commodity futures risk 
premium, which is central to the Theory of Normal Backwardation of Keynes and Hicks, is zero 
by  assumption.  In  our  model  of  commodity  futures  presented  in  Appendix  A,  both  the 
convenience yield and the risk premium emerge endogenously as functions of inventory.  In this 
sense,  equations  (1)  and  (2)  are  both  consistent  with  our  equilibrium  model.  To  link  the 
equilibrium spot prices emanating from inter-temporal inventory decisions to commodity futures, 
we extend the DL model by adding futures markets and risk-averse investors to their model. We 
also assume that inventory holders face a bankruptcy cost, which provides them with a hedging 
motive.  The existence of the futures market provides the inventory holders with an opportunity to 
hedge bankruptcy costs.  They can use the futures market to transfer future spot price risk to risk 
averse  investors,  at  a  price.    The  model  determines  the  risk  premium  paid  by  the  inventory 
holders  to  the  risk-averse  investors,  as  a  function  of  the  extent  of  the  size  of  the  expected 
bankruptcy costs, the degree of risk aversion of the investors, and the level of inventories. The 
level of inventories matters for the risk premium because, as in DL, future spot price variance is 
negatively related to the level of inventories. That is, when inventories are low, the variance of 
the future spot price is higher due to an increased likelihood of a stock-out, resulting in the risk-
averse investors demanding a higher risk premium. The actual amount of hedging may either 
increase  or  decrease,  depending  on  the  relative  sensitivities  of  the  inventory  holders  and  the 
investors to risk. We can summarize the relevant comparative statistics of the model, as follows.  
 
An inverse and nonlinear basis-inventory relation: Positive demand shocks and negative supply 
shocks lead to a drop in inventories, and result in an increase in spot prices, signalling the scarcity   8 
of the commodity in the spot market.  Futures prices will also increase, but not by as much as spot 
prices. First, futures prices reflect expectations about future spot prices, and embed expectations 
that inventories will be restored over time and spot prices will return to “normal” levels.  Second, 
the risk premium may increase. Both effects act to widen the difference between spot and futures 
prices.  This inverse relation between the basis and inventory should become more pronounced as 
the inventory level is near stock-out if the demand for the commodity remains positive for very 
high prices, which is the case during occasional price spikes.  We will be looking for evidence of 
this nonlinearity.  This can be viewed as a test of the DL model of storage dynamics. 
 
An inverse risk premium-inventory relation:  When inventories are low and spot prices high, the 
buffer function of inventories to absorb shocks is diminished. In these circumstances, the risk of a 
stock-out  increases  which  raises  the  conditional  variance  (volatility)  of  the  future  spot  price. 
Because commodity futures are used to insure price risk, inventory theory predicts an increase in 
the risk premium.   
 
Momentum in commodity futures excess returns: Although not formally modelled in our two-
period model of Appendix A, inventories can only be restored through new production, a process 
which  can  take  a  considerable  amount  of  time  depending  on  the  commodity.  Therefore, 
deviations of inventories from normal levels are expected to be persistent, as are the probability 
of stock-outs and associated changes in the conditional volatility of spot prices. Because past 
unexpected increases in spot and futures prices are signals of past shocks to inventories, they are 
expected  to  be  correlated  with  expected  futures  risk  premiums.  This  will  induce  a  form  of 
“momentum” in futures excess returns: the initial unexpected spot price spike due to a negative 
shock to inventories will be followed by a temporary period of high expected futures returns for 
that commodity. 
We now turn to testing these predictions. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.1 Commodity Futures Prices  
Monthly data on futures prices of individual commodities were obtained from the Commodities 
Research Bureau (CRB) and the London Metals Exchange (LME). The details of these data are 
described in Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), who studied all 36 commodities futures that were 
traded at the four North American exchanges (NYMEX, NYBOT, CBOT, and CME) and the   9 
LME in 2004.  For the present study, we drop electricity (because no inventory exists by its very 
nature), and gold and silver (because these are essentially financial futures).  This leaves us with 
33 commodities. We constructed rolling commodity futures excess returns by selecting at the end 
of each month the nearest to maturity contract that would not expire during the next month.  That 
is, the excess return from the end of month t to the next is calculated as: 
T t




, , 1 - +  
where Ft,T is the futures price at the end of month t on the nearest contract whose expiration date 
T is after the end of month t+1, and Ft+1,T  is the price of the same contract at the end of month 
t+1. 
Table 1 contains simple summary statistics for the 33 commodities for periods ending in 
December 2006. In addition to the 33 commodity futures, the first row of the table (labeled 
“index”)  shows  the  statistics  for  an  equally-weighed,  monthly  rebalanced,  index  of  the 
commodity futures returns.  It is therefore the simple average for each month of the excess returns 
for those commodity futures that were traded in that month. The period of calculation, which ends 
in December 2006, differs across commodities because the starting month varies.  We take the 
starting month to be the latest of: the first month of the inventory series, the 12th month since the 
futures contract for the commodity started to trade, and December 1969.
5  We require a 12-month 
trading history because later in the paper we will examine the role of prior 12-month returns. We 
require the starting month to be December 1969 at the earliest because before 1970 we have only 
two commodities (Cocoa and Soybeans) for which both futures price data and inventory data are 
available. The third column indicates the first month of the sample for the commodity. The fourth 
column of the table lists the number of monthly observations in our sample.   
Columns 5-9 of the table have statistics of the excess returns. Although the sample period 
is  slightly  different  than  in  Gorton  and  Rouwenhorst  (2006),  these  summary  statistics  are 
qualitatively similar to their study. Of the 33 sample commodities 26 (21) earned a positive risk 
premium  over  the  sample  as  measured  by  the  sample  arithmetic  (geometric)  average  excess 
return.  An  equally-weighted  index  earned  an  excess  return  of  5.48%  per  annum.  The  next 
columns show that the return distributions of commodity futures typically are skewed to the right 
and have fat tails. DL (1992) make similar observations concerning the distribution of commodity 
spot prices. Columns 10 and 11 indicate that commodity futures excess returns are positively 
                                                 
5 Natural Gas is exempted from this rule.  Natural Gas futures started trading in April 1990.  The starting 
month for Natural Gas is nevertheless set to December 1990, because we wish to include this important 
commodity in the sub-sample of December 1990-December 2006 to be examined later in Tables 5-8.   10 
correlated (on average) with the returns on other commodity futures, but the correlations are on 
average low (0.12). The average correlation of individual returns with the return on the equally-
weighted index is 0.40.  
Finally, the last column of the table shows that the sample average (percentage) basis has 
been negative for two-thirds of the commodities.
6 An equally-weighted portfolio of the sample 
commodities had an average basis of −2.10%, indicating that on average across commodities and 
time periods futures prices have exceeded contemporaneous spot prices. Otherwise stated, on 
average, commodity futures markets have been in “contango.” At the same time, the average 
excess return on the equally-weighted index has been positive (5.48% per annum), indicating a 
historical risk premium to the long side of a commodity futures position.  
These  observations  are  of  interest,  because  the  futures  basis  is  often  referred  to  by 
practitioners  as  the  “roll-yield”  of  a  commodity  futures  position,  and  a  positive  roll  yield 
(“backwardation”)  is  sometimes  viewed  as  a  requirement  for  the  existence  of  a  positive risk 
premium  to  a  long  position  in  commodity  futures  markets.  This  view  is  typically  based  on 
arguments such as that portrayed in Figure 1.  Figure 1 plots the average basis against the average 
return  on  individual  collateralized  futures  during  the  1991–2006  period.  Figure  1  suggests  a 
connection between the risk premium and commodity characteristics, as measured by the basis.  
A simple linear regression has an R-squared of 52%. 
In our discussion of equations (1) and (2) in Section 2, we already observed that these are 
not mutually exclusive: the futures basis compares futures prices to contemporaneous spot prices, 
while the risk premium in equation (2) is the difference between futures prices and expected 
future spot prices. Equation (1) shows that for commodities to be stored, futures prices have to 
exceed contemporaneous spot prices to compensate inventory holders for the full cost of storage. 
Only when inventories are sufficiently low can the spot price exceed the futures price corrected 
for the cost of carry, i.e. when the convenience yield is sufficiently high. The sample average 
basis of −2.10% simply indicates that inventories have been sufficiently high on average for the 
convenience yield not to exceed the full cost of storage. At the same time futures prices have been 
set at a discount to average future spot prices, rewarding the long side of the futures position for 
providing price insurance. 
7 
                                                 
6 The basis is calculated for each commodity as (F1/F2 -1) * 365/(D2 – D1), where F1 is the nearest futures 
contract and F2 is the next nearest futures contract; D1 and D2 are the number of days until the last trading 
date of the respective contracts.  The period over which the sample is calculated for the basis is from the 
month indicated in third column of the table to November 2006, so the sample size is the same as that for 
the excess return. 
7 A reference to financial futures may be instructive in this context, as financial futures do not have a 
convenience yield. When the dividend yield on equities is below the interest rate, equity futures price will   11 
However compelling Figure 1 may seem at first glance, it does not directly speak to the 
presence of risk premiums because the basis and futures returns are ex-post correlated even when 
ex-ante risk premiums are zero. To see this, imagine a temporary negative shock to the supply (or 
a positive shock to the demand) of a commodity in a world where risk premiums are zero, and 
futures prices simply reflect expectations about future spot prices. This negative shock to supply 
will unexpectedly increase both spot and futures prices, but increase spot prices more than futures 
prices – reflecting expectations that inventories will be restored over time and spot prices will 
revert to their mean. In this event, a positive futures return coincides with an increase of the basis. 
By symmetry, during periods of positive supply shocks, futures returns will be low during periods 
when the basis falls. Ex-post, therefore, commodities with a high sample average basis are also 
expected to have high realized average returns. In what follows, we analyze these issues. 
The relationship between the basis and ex-ante risk premiums is the subject of Section 5, 
in which we examine the predictive power of the basis for risk premiums, and the extent to which 
this predictability stems from variation in inventory levels. In the next sub-section we will present 
our inventory data.  
 
3.2 Inventory Data 
There are many issues involved in compiling a dataset on inventories, the least of which is the 
absence  of  a  common  data  source.  In  addition  to  data  availability,  there  is  the  important 
conceptual question of how to define the relevant inventories. Because most commodity futures 
contracts  call  for  physical  delivery  at  a  particular  location,  futures  prices  should  reflect  the 
perceived relative scarcity of the amount of the commodity which is available for immediate and 
future delivery at that location. For example, data on warehouse stocks of industrial metals held at 
the exchange are available from the LME, but no data is available on stocks that are held off-
exchange but that could be economically delivered at the warehouse on short notice. Similarly, 
relevant crude oil inventories would include not only physical stocks held at the delivery point in 
Cushing,  Oklahoma,  but  also  oil  which  is  held  at  international  locations  but  that  could  be 
economically shipped there, or perhaps even government stocks. Aside from the definition of 
relevant inventories there is a timing issue. Information about inventories is often published with 
a lag and subsequently revised. This creates a timing issue in matching variation of prices to 
variation of inventories. Despite these potential caveats, the behavior of inventories is central to 
                                                                                                                                                 
exceed spot prices, and the markets will be in “contango” This is not incompatible with the presence of a 
positive equity risk premium.    12 
the Theory of Storage, and for this reason it is important to attempt to document the empirical 
relationship between measured inventories and futures prices. 
We collected a sample of inventory data for the 33 individual commodities of Table 1 
from a variety of sources. With the exception of Sugar, Feeder Cattle, and Rough Rice, we were 
able to find monthly data for all commodities. For Feeder Cattle, we do not use the available 
inventory series, which is quarterly.  Instead we use 3-month-ahead values of the Live Cattle 
inventory for the current monthly level of Feeder Cattle, under the assumption that it takes three 
months to feed calves to create what are called Feeder Cattle.  A detailed description of these data 
is in Appendix B.  In the rest of the paper, we will drop Sugar and Rough Rice and focus on the 
31 commodities with monthly inventory data. 
Examination  of  the  data  reveals  that  the  inventory  time-series  of  most  commodities 
contains a time-trend and exhibits strong seasonal variation. We estimated individual inventory 
trends by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the log of inventories for individual commodities. 
We will sometimes refer to the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered inventory data as the “normal” 
inventory level and denote it by I*.
8 
To illustrate the seasonal variation of commodity inventories around these trends we ran 
a regression of the deviations of the log of inventories from their HP-fitted trends on monthly 
dummy variables. Table 2 reports the regression results along with the autocorrelation of the 
residuals (which are de-trended and de-seasonalized inventories). The table helps to illustrate two 
stylized  facts  about  inventories.  First,  inventory  levels  are  persistent.  At  0.71  inventories  of 
Soybean  Meal  have  the  lowest  sample  first-order  autocorrelation,  and  the  median  first-order 
autocorrelation exceeds 0.90. Second, there are large cross-sectional differences in the seasonal 
behavior of inventories. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the seasonal variation of 
inventories of Natural Gas, Wheat, and Corn. The seasonal variation of inventories stems from 
both  demand  and  supply.  Many  agricultural  commodities  are  harvested  once  a  year  and 
inventories are held to meet demand throughout the year.  Inventories therefore are lowest just 
prior to the harvest season and peak at the end of the harvest season. For example, Corn is 
                                                 
8 The  smoothness  parameter  we  use  when  applying  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter  to  monthly  series  is 
determined  as  follows.  Ravin  and  Uhlig  (2002)  recommend  adjusting  the  smoothness  parameter  in 
proportion to the fourth power of the relative frequency.  So if x is the smoothness parameter for a quarterly 
series, the monthly equivalent is x times 3
4 (=81).  In business cycle analysis, it is customary to use 1,600 
for quarterly series.  As shown in Ravin and Uhlig (2002), this amounts to retaining peak-to-peak cyclical 
movements of roughly 10 years or longer, so the difference between the raw series and the filtered series 
consists  of  movements  of  relatively  short  durations.    One  would  think  that  determinants  of  a  normal 
inventory, such as storability and production flexibility, change only gradually.  If so, the smoothness 
parameter should be larger.  From visual inspection, we chose a smoothness parameter of 160,000 (whose 
monthly equivalent is this times 81).  This amounts to retaining peak-to-peak cyclical movements of about 
30 years or longer.   13 
harvested in late summer to fall in North America. Wheat is harvested in the early summer in the 
Southern  states  in  the  U.S.,  and  in  late  summer  in  the  Northern  states.    Wheat  inventories 
therefore are lowest just prior to the harvest season and peak at the end of the harvest season. 
Contrary to Corn and Wheat, Natural Gas is produced throughout the year, but heating demand 
has a strong seasonal component which peaks during the winter months.  During months of low 
demand, Natural Gas is stored in underground salt domes. Industrial Metals inventories exhibit 
little seasonal variation as exhibited by the low regression R-squared given in the table. Crude oil 
is demanded and produced during the year, but demand for its derivatives --- Heating Oil and 
Unleaded Gas --- is more seasonal. Because Soybean Oil and Soy Meal are derived commodities 
and can be produced throughout the year, they exhibit less seasonality than the inventories of 
Soybeans themselves. 
 
4. Inventories and Futures Prices 
 
This section provides empirical evidence about the relationship between (1) inventory levels and 
risk premiums of commodity futures and (2) between inventories and the basis. In Section 4.1 we 
test the central prediction of the Theory of Storage that the marginal convenience yield as proxied 
for by the basis is a declining function of inventories. This motivates the use of the basis as a 
measure of the state of inventories. Section 4.2 examines the link between inventories and risk 
premiums. 
 
4.1. Basis and Inventories 
As  a  preliminary  test,  we  examine  whether  the  futures  basis  varies  between  high  and  low 
inventory months. Let I and I* indicate the actual and normal inventory level at the end of the 
month.
9 For each commodity we calculate the average basis for months when the normalized 
inventory I/I* (the ratio of actual to normal inventory levels) is below 1 and above 1. The results 
are summarized in Figure 3. The figure illustrates that for all commodities low inventory months 
are associated with above average basis for that commodity and that the basis is below average 
during  high  inventory  months.    As  indicated  by  the  red  line,  the  difference  is  statistically 
significant at the conventional 5% level for most commodities.  (The calculation of the t-values is 
explained in Appendix C.1.) 
                                                 
9 For simplicity we have omitted time subscripts, but keep in mind that the normal inventory level changes 
through time.   14 
To further explore the non-linear relationship between the basis and inventories we 
estimate the following non-linear relationship: 
               
error ) ( dummies   seasonal   of function  linear  + + = x h Basis ,  
 
where  x  is the normalized inventory level I/I*.  The hypothesis is that as inventory levels fall 
below “normal,” as measured by I*, the basis increases at an increasing rate. To allow for this 
nonlinearity we applied the “cubic spline regression” technique (see. e.g., Green and Silverman 
(1994) for a textbook treatment). This is a technique for estimating potentially nonlinear functions. 
Splines are piece-wise polynomial functions that fit together at “knots.” In the case of cubic 
splines, the first and second derivatives are continuous at the knots.
10 
To test whether the basis is negatively related to inventories and whether the relationship 
is,  in  fact,  nonlinear,  we  will  estimate  the  slope,  implied  by  the  spline  function  ) (x h  at  the 
average level of inventories (I = I*) as well as in situations when inventories fall 25% below 
average (I/I* = 0.75).  For each commodity, the sample period is the same as shown in Table 1.  
The results of these tests are summarized in Table 3, and illustrated in Figure 4 for Copper and 
Crude Oil. 
The second and third columns of Table 3 show that at the average level of inventories 
(i.e., at I=I*), the estimated slope of the basis-inventory regression is negative for all commodities 
except  one,  and  statistically  significant  for  more  than  half  of  the  commodities.  For  each 
commodity group, using pooled OLS we estimate the coefficients under the constraint that they 
are the same within groups. Inspection of the size of the coefficients shows that the relationship is 
particularly strong for commodities in the Energy group (the pooled OLS estimate for Energy is  
–154.6), while many Industrial Metals tend to have slope coefficients that are relatively small in 
magnitude (the pooled OLS estimate is –5.1). Industrial Metals are relatively easy and cheap to 
store, and equilibrium inventories of Industrial Metals are expected to be large on average relative 
                                                 
10 The internal breakpoints that define the piecewise segments are called “knots.”    Let  j x  ( J j ,..., 2 , 1 = , 
J x x x < < < < ... 0 2 1 )  be  so-called  “knots”.    The  cubic  spline  technique  approximates  ) (x h  by: 
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2 1 }, { 1 ) ( ) ( b b b b where {} 1  is  the  indicator  function.  By 
construction, the second derivative of  ) (x h  is continuous at each knot. The attraction of a cubic spline is 
that the approximating function is linear in powers of x .  We experimented with  J  on our data, and 
decided to set  1 = J  and set  1 x  to be 1 (i.e.,  * I I = ).  For larger values of J , there were too many peaks 
and troughs in the estimated cubic spline.   15 
to demand. By comparison, Energy, which is more bulky and expensive to store, should have 
lower inventories relative to demand. Cross-sectional differences in storability should therefore 
be reflected in the sensitivity of the basis to inventory shocks. Perishability also helps to explain 
why the slope coefficients for Meats are on average larger than for commodities in the Softs and 
Grains groups. Because storage costs provide an incentive to economize on inventories, it is also 
expected that the variation of inventories is lower for commodities that are difficult to store, 
relative to commodities that are easy to store: this is illustrated in the two panels of Figure 4, 
which shows much larger variation in the inventories of Copper than in the inventories of Crude 
Oil. 
To examine the non-linearity of the basis-inventory relationship, the fourth column of 
Table 3 reports the slope when inventories fall by 25% from their average value. In the case of 
Copper, for example, the estimated slope measured at the average level of inventories equals       
–3.2 (t = –0.61) and steepens to –15.3 (t = –2.76) when inventories drop by 25%. This difference 
of 12.1, given in column 6, is significant at the 5% level (t = 5.64).  Inspection of columns 6 and 
7 shows a pattern of steepening slopes for many commodities in the Metals, Grains, and Softs 
group. The results are weaker for Meats and Energies. Inspection of the inventory data for energy 
commodities shows that historical inventories often fluctuate within a narrow range, and in some 
cases do not fall to the test level of 0.75. Consequently, the slope coefficients at 0.75 are merely 
polynomial extrapolations of a relationship constructed to fit a different portion of the sample and 
should be taken with caution.  This point is clearly seen from Panel B of Figure 4 for Crude Oil.   
Overall our results are not inconsistent with the Theory of Storage.
11  We find that there 
is a clear negative relationship between normalized inventories and the basis and that for many 
commodities the slope of the basis-inventory curve becomes more negative at lower inventories 
levels. And we find steeper slopes at normal inventory levels for commodities that are difficult to 
store. We turn to the relationship between inventories and risk premiums next. 
 
4.2. Inventories and Futures Risk Premiums 
As mentioned previously, the Theory of Storage due to Deaton and Laroque (1992) does not 
make direct predictions about futures risk premiums, but instead makes predictions about the 
future volatility of spot prices. This prediction stems from the fact that when inventories are low, 
the  ability  of  inventories  to  absorb  shocks  to  demand  and  supply  is  diminished,  raising  the 
conditional volatility of future spot prices. In our model, to the extent that the risk premium on 
                                                 
11 The results of Table 3 are not significantly altered if the dependent variable is the interested-adjusted 
basis; see Equation (1).   16 
long futures positions is compensation paid by hedgers to obtain insurance against price risk, the 
mean excess return from commodity futures should increase when future spot price risk increases.  
Therefore, the Theory of Storage implies that the state of inventory at the end of the month is a 
key predictor of the excess return from the end of the month to the next and that the mean excess 
return and inventory are inversely related.   
As a first test of this prediction, we perform a linear regression of the monthly excess 
return from the end of month t-1 to t on I/I* measured at the end of month t-1 as well as monthly 
dummies.  The Theory predicts that I/I*, our measure of the state of inventories, should have a 
negative effect on the subsequent excess returns. The results are reported in Table 4.  Unlike in 
the basis-on-inventory regression of Table 3, we only consider the linear specification because the 
excess return is a hard variable to predict, as evidenced in the low R-squared in Table 4.  As is 
apparent from the low t-values, the I/I* coefficients are not sharply estimated. However, most of 
them have the expected negative sign. If we impose the restriction of a common slope coefficient 
within groups, we find marginally significant negative slope coefficients for Meats and Energy. 
These groups also exhibit a larger sensitivity of returns to inventories, which is consistent with 
our findings in Table 3 that futures prices of commodities that are difficult to store are more 
sensitive to inventory shocks than commodities that are relatively easy to store.  
In a second test, we examine the results of a simple sorting strategy, whereby at the end 
of each month we cross-sectionally rank the commodities based on their level of normalized 
inventories.  The number of available commodities at the end of each month increases over time 
because the start date, shown in the third column of Table 1, differs across commodities.  At the 
end of the first month (December 1969), for example, there are seven available commodities.  We 
compare the average return of a portfolio of commodities in the top half in terms of normalized 
inventories to the average return of a portfolio comprised of the commodities in the bottom half 
of  this  ranking.  This  test  has  the  additional  attractive  features  that  it  controls  for  the  cross-
sectional dependence and, as it is nonparametric, it allows for a non-linear relationship between 
inventories and the risk premium.  
The  results  are  given  in  Table  5.  The  returns  of  the  inventory-sorted  portfolios  are 
consistent with the predictions of the theory that low inventories are associated with high future 
risk premiums. Panel A summarizes the returns to these portfolios in deviation from the equally-
weighted index. The first columns show that the Low Inventory portfolio has outperformed the 
High Inventory portfolios in 56% of the months between 1969 and 2006. The annualized average 
out-performance was 8.06 % (t = 3.19). The next columns show that the performance difference   17 
between the inventory-sorted portfolios has been relatively stable during the more recent periods 
of January 1986-December 2006 and December 1990-December 2006. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we summarize various characteristics of the commodities in the 
inventory sorted portfolios: for reasons we will discuss in greater detail in the next section, we 
report  the  average  prior  12-month  futures  return  prior  to  portfolio  formation,  the  average 
percentage 12-month change in spot prices (as measured by the nearest-to-maturity futures price), 
the average futures basis and the average commodity volatility during the month of the futures 
return (defined as the standard deviation of daily futures excess returns).  The Low Inventory 
portfolio selects commodities with a high basis: the difference between the basis of the Low and 
High Inventory portfolios exceeds 12% (t = 14.51). This is, of course, a direct implication of the 
Theory of Storage, and consistent with our earlier findings in Table 3, and Figure 3. In addition to 
having a higher basis, Low Inventory commodities also have higher prior spot and prior futures 
returns  than  High  Inventory  commodities.  Over  the  full  sample,  the  12-month  futures  return 
difference prior to inclusion in the portfolio is about 15% per annum (t = 6.45). The high prior 
futures return of the Low Inventory portfolio suggests that our portfolio sorts capture more than 
variation of inventories that is predictable. High prior futures returns are an indication of past 
negative  shocks  to  supply  and/or  positive  shocks  to  demand.  Because  inventories  cannot  be 
replenished instantaneously, the prior futures return history carries information about the current 
state of inventories. We will return to this issue in the next section when we investigate the extent 
to which inventory dynamics can be responsible for the presence of momentum in commodity 
futures markets.  
Finally, the right hand of Panel B summarizes the Positions of Traders in the inventory-
sorted portfolios, as reported by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). These 
positions will be discussed in more detail in the next section 6 of the paper, but for now note that 
Commercial traders are net short in commodity futures markets and as a percentage of open 
interest, that their positions are larger for High Inventory commodities. 
Two caveats are in order about our trading rule test. First, the tests do not control for 
(unknown)  publication  delays  in  the  release  of  inventory  data.  If  news  about  inventories  is 
negatively correlated with contemporaneous spot prices, and inventory data is released with a lag, 
this will create a negative correlation between innovations to inventories and subsequent spot 
price innovations. Because futures prices will inherit spot price innovations, the delay of news 
about inventories will create a correlation between inventories and subsequent futures returns that 
is  unrelated  to  futures  risk  premiums.    Second,  our  test  does  not  exploit  cross-sectional 
differences  between  commodities.  Because  commodities  differ  in  terms  of  storability   18 
(perishability, bulkiness, and capacity constraints of storage) the Theory of Storage predicts that 
equilibrium inventory policies will differ across commodities. Furthermore,  uncertainty about 
future demand and supply is also likely to vary across commodities, leading to cross-sectional 
differences in optimal inventory policies that are positively associated with futures risk premiums.   
Absent a structural equilibrium model that includes multiple commodities we have no 
guide  as  to  how  to  compare  the  state  of  inventories  across  commodities.  Theoretically,  the 
important state variable is the “likelihood of stock-out,” which we have proxied for by using I/I*, 
the inventory level relative to normal inventories, but this measure does not permit comparisons 
across commodities.  In the next section we will examine three predictions of the Theory of 
Storage that use price-based measures of the state of inventories that circumvent these difficulties. 
 
5.  Price-Based Tests of the Cross-Sectional Variation of Futures Risk Premiums 
 
In the previous section, we provided evidence that the shape of a futures curve, i.e., the basis, 
reflects information about the state of that commodity’s inventory, and that inventory levels are 
negatively related to subsequent excess returns to commodity futures. In this section, we discuss 
three additional and related predictions of the Theory of Storage about spot and futures prices. 
First, when inventories fall spot prices will increase, signalling the scarcity of the commodity for 
immediate delivery. High spot prices are therefore a signal of the state of inventories. Second, 
shocks to current inventories also raise futures prices although not by as much as spot prices 
reflecting expectations that inventories will be restored over time and spot prices will return to 
“normal” (and perhaps because the risk premium rises). Hence the futures basis widens. Third, to 
the extent that inventories are slow to adjust, past demand and supply shocks will persist in 
current  inventory  levels.  Because  unanticipated  shocks  to  demand  and  supply  affect  futures 
prices, the futures return history of a commodity carries information about past demand and 
supply shocks that may not be fully resolved due to the slow adjustment of inventories. In sum, 
the level of spot prices, the futures basis, and prior futures returns can be expected to carry 
information  about  the  current  state  of  inventories,  and  hence  will  be  correlated  with  risk 
premiums. 
Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates that the relation between inventories and 12-month prior 
futures returns for individual commodities. Similar to Panel A, for the basis, we calculate average 
prior 12-month futures returns for each commodity for months when I/I* is above unity and when 
I/I* is below 1. The Figure illustrates that for most commodities, high normalized inventories are 
associated with low futures returns over the prior year, while low inventory states are associated   19 
with  high  prior  12-month  futures  returns.  Taken  together,  Figure  3  shows  that  prior  futures 
returns and the basis are informative price-based signals of the level of inventories. To the extent 
that the level of inventories is relevant for futures risk premiums, as suggested in Table 5, it can 
be expected that prior futures and spot returns and the basis predict risk premiums on commodity 
futures. In the remainder of this section we will examine the extent to which these price signals 
carry information about expected futures returns.  
There  are  two  advantages  to  using  observable  prices  as  indicators  of  the  state  of 
inventories.  First,  price  information  does  not  suffer  from  revisions  and  publication  delays 
associated with inventory data. Second, using price information opens the potential to exploit 
cross-sectional  differences  between  expected  commodity  futures  returns.  For  example,  if  a 
particular commodity is difficult or costly to store, then all else equal, the Theory of Storage 
predicts  a  lower  level  of  equilibrium  inventories.  Lower  average  inventories  will  make  a 
commodity  more  susceptible  to  the  risk  of  stock-outs,  and  the  associated  futures  contract  is 
expected to have a higher equilibrium risk premium. To the extent that these cross-sectional 
differences are embedded in the shape of the futures curve such as the basis, we expect our price 
signals to capture this information about cross-sectional differences in expected futures returns 
To quantify the information in price signals about both the cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in risk premiums, we divide the sample of commodities into halves at the end of each 
month  based  on  their  prior  performance  and  the  futures  basis.  We  measure  the  total  futures 
returns of these portfolios during the month until the last day of the month when we re-sort and 
rebalance.  The  portfolios  are  equally-weighted.  The  performance  and  characteristics  of  the 
portfolios are given in Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the returns on the portfolios formed by sorting based on 
the basis. Over the full sample period since 1969, the High Basis portfolio outperformed the 
equally-weighted  index  by  5.42%  annualized  (t  =  3.98)  while  the  Low  Basis  portfolio 
underperformed the average commodity by 4.82% (t = −3.44). The difference between the High 
and Low Basis portfolio was positive in 58% of the months and averaged 10.23% annualized (t = 
3.73).  
Panel B of Table 6 reports several characteristics of the basis-sorted portfolios. To the 
extent that the futures basis carries information about the state of inventories, it can be expected 
that the High Basis portfolio selects commodities that have below average inventories, high spot 
prices (measured relative to the same time last year), and high prior 12-month futures returns. 
And as predicted by DL (1992) High Basis commodities are expected to have relatively high 
future  price  volatility.  These  predictions  are  indeed  borne  out  by  the  data:  the  High  Basis   20 
portfolio selects commodities with low inventories (t = −17.08), high futures returns during the 
12-month period prior to portfolio formation (t = 12.93), and high spot prices relative to the same 
time a year prior (t = 10.45). Somewhat surprisingly, the difference between the volatility of the 
commodities is both economically as well as statistically relatively small (t = 2.13).  
The right two-thirds of Table 6 examines two more recent sub-periods.  These panels 
show that these returns and portfolio characteristics have been relatively stable during the first 
and second halves of our sample. The last three rows of Panel B summarize the positions of 
Traders  in  the  basis-sorted  portfolios,  as  reported  by  the  Commodities  Futures  Trading 
Commission (CFTC). These will be discussed in more detail in the next section of the paper, but 
for  now  note  that  Commercials  are  on  average  net  short  in  both  the  High  and  Low  Basis 
portfolios,  and  Non-Commercials  and  small  (Non-Reportable)  traders  are  net  long.    Non-
Commercials are over-weighted in the High Basis commodities, and the reverse holds for the 
Non-Reportable positions. There is no significant difference in the positions of Commercials 
between the two portfolios. 
Inspection of the portfolio characteristics suggests that the basis-sorted portfolios capture 
time-series  variation  of  risk  premiums  by  selecting  commodities  when  inventories  are  low. 
However,  as  pointed  out  before,  differences  in  the  basis  can  also  reflect  cross-sectional 
differences in storability of commodities that is correlated with (unconditional) risk premiums. To 
examine whether the returns to the basis strategies capture time-series variation of risk premiums 
or  simply  select  commodities  that  are  difficult  to  store,  we  repeated  the  portfolio  sorts  after 
subtracting the full sample mean from the basis for each commodity. This isolates the returns that 
can be attributed to time-series variation of the basis from return variation attributed to cross-
sectional variation in the average basis. Unreported results show that the sample average return 
difference between High and Low (de-meaned) Basis portfolios is 10.13% (t = 3.52), which is not 
significantly different from the returns associated with sorting on the raw basis. This suggests that 
the returns of sorting commodities on the raw basis primarily captures time-variation of futures 
returns that is associated with time variation of inventories. 
Table 7 summarizes the returns to sorting commodities on Futures Momentum, measured 
as the prior 12-month futures return. Although momentum has  been documented at horizons 
ranging from one month to one year, we chose to report results for a relatively long prior return 
interval (e.g., see Pirrong (2005) and Shen, Szakmary, and Sharma (2007)).  Our choice is driven 
by our goal of constructing a price-based measure of inventories. Based on the empirical evidence 
of  Table  2  that  inventories  are  slow  to  adjust,  we  expect  relatively  distant  prior  shocks  to 
inventories  to  carry  information  about  current  inventories.  Because  some  commodities  have   21 
distinct annual seasonal variation in production, we include a history of up to one year in our 
price-based  measure  of  past  positive  demand  shocks  or  negative  supply  shocks.  Unreported 
results show that sorting on longer term measures of past futures returns increases the dispersion 
between the inventory characteristics of the momentum portfolios.  
Panel A shows that High Momentum commodities have outperformed a portfolio of Low 
Momentum commodity futures by 13.36% per annum (t = 4.93), earning positive excess returns 
in 58% of the months. The point estimates for the excess returns are slightly higher for the second 
half of the sample, as well as the fraction of the months the excess return is positive (65% since 
1990, versus 58% over the full sample). Panel B shows that Momentum portfolios take positions 
in similar commodities as the Basis-sorted portfolios. In particular, the High Momentum portfolio 
selects commodities with High Basis and below average inventories, while the Low Momentum 
portfolio does the opposite. The t-statistics associated with these characteristics differences are 
large and clearly indicate that portfolios sorted on inventories, the basis, and prior performance 
take correlated positions in ways that are predicted by the Theory of Storage. This is reflected in 
the correlation between the returns to High Basis and High Momentum portfolios, which is 0.87 
over the full sample period. Inspection of the Positions of Traders reveals  that Commercials 
increase  their  short  positions  in  commodities  that  experience  price  increases,  while  Non-
Commercials take larger long positions following a price run-up.  
Finally, Table 8 reports the results from sorting commodities based on the change in the 
year-on-year percentage change of the commodity spot price. In light of the seasonality of spot 
prices of many commodities the 12-month prior spot return captures the change in the relative 
scarcity of each commodity compared to the same time a year ago. Panel A of the Table shows 
that the results for portfolios sorted on Spot Momentum are quantitatively similar to those sorted 
on  Futures  Momentum.  The  High  Spot  Momentum  portfolio  has  outperformed  the  Low 
Momentum portfolio by 13.85 % annualized (t = 4.95) over the full sample, and by 16.03% 
during the last 16 years (t = 4.47). And High Spot Momentum commodities have relatively low 
inventories, high futures momentum, and a high basis. Inspection of the Positions of Traders 
shows  that  Commercials  hedge  more  after  spot  prices  have  increased  and  that  much  of  the 
liquidity to them is provided by the Non-Commercials. 
The  main  conclusion  from  Tables  5-8  is  that,  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  the 
Theory of Storage developed in Appendix A, risk premiums of commodity futures vary with the 
state of inventories. Portfolios that take positions based on prior futures return, prior spot returns 
and the futures basis select commodity futures with below average inventories which the Theory 
predicts are expected to earn higher risk premiums. Moreover, these risk premiums are highly   22 
significant, both in a statistical sense as well as in an economic sense. We also presented some 
evidence that the Position of Traders varies with the return of the price-based portfolio strategies 
– especially Momentum and Inventories, although the interpretation of the positions evidence is 
somewhat ambiguous. Commercials increase their short positions after a price run-up, but also 
when inventories are high. Non-commercials take larger long positions in commodities with high 
momentum, and, to a lesser extent, high basis.  
In our model in Appendix A, the correlation between inventories and the amount of open 
interest in the futures market is ambiguous and depends on the relative sensitivities of the risk-
averse investors and the inventory holders, seeking to hedge bankruptcy costs. However, the co-
movement between the basis, inventories, momentum and traders’ positions raises the question of 
a causal relationship; in particular we are interested whether the positions of market participants 
can provide an alternative explanation for our results. We explore this issue in more depth in the 
next section. 
 
6. Risk Premiums and the Positions of Traders 
 
It is difficult to reconcile commodity futures risk premiums with traditional asset pricing models, 
because historical excess returns to commodity futures have low correlations with equities and 
aggregate consumption, which are important measures of risk in traditional asset pricing models 
[e.g.,  Jagannathan  (1985),  and  Gorton  and  Rouwenhorst  (2006)].  In  part  for  this  reason,  the 
prevailing explanation for commodity futures risk premiums in the empirical literature has been 
hedging-pressure,  which  is  based  on  the  Keynesian  Theory  of  Normal  Backwardation.  This 
section re-examines the evidence for the hedging-pressure hypothesis, and tests whether hedging 
pressure can provide an alternative explanation for the variation of the risk premiums documented 
in this paper. 
In the Keynesian view, the function of commodity futures markets is to enable a risk 
transfer  between  hedgers  and  investors/speculators.  The  Theory  of  Normal  Backwardation 
postulates that hedgers are on net short and offer speculators a risk premium by setting futures 
prices at a discount relative to expected future spot prices. Academic researchers have tested this 
prediction by examining the relation between futures returns and “hedging pressure” – defined as 
the  relative  size  of  the  short  positions  taken  by  hedgers.  Empirically,  hedging  pressure  is 
measured using data on positions of large traders published by the CFTC. In the Commitment of 
Traders Reports large traders are classified as “commercials” or “non-commercials.” The CFTC 
omits information about the specific identities of traders, but it has become customary in the   23 
academic literature to view commercials as hedgers and non-commercial as investors.
12 Several 
papers, including papers by Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983), Chang (1985), Bessembinder 
(1992), and De Roon, Nijman, and Veld (2000), Dincerler, Khokher and Titman (2003) and 
Dincerler, Khokher and Simin (2004) show that the relative size of the commercial positions is 
correlated with futures risk premiums.
13  
The interpretation of the empirical evidence on hedging pressure is complicated by two 
issues. First, most papers document a contemporaneous correlation between futures prices and 
traders’ positions. The contemporaneous correlation may simply reflect the response of traders to 
changes in futures prices and does not speak to a causal relationship.
14 The first question we ask 
therefore  is  whether  hedging  pressure  is  correlated  with  expected  future  commodity  risk 
premiums. Second, these papers treat hedging pressure as exogenous, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that traders’ positions reflect an equilibrium response to demand and supply shocks to 
physical  commodity  markets.  For  example,  when  a  negative  supply  shock  drives  down 
inventories and increases current spot and futures prices, hedgers might find it advantageous to 
hedge  more  in  equilibrium,  despite  the  fact  that  the  compensation  they  have  to  offer  to 
speculators has increased due to increased uncertainty about future spot prices. Therefore, the 
second question of interest is: if hedging pressure predicts ex-ante risk premiums, to what extent 
does this reflect an optimal response to fundamental shocks? 
Table 9 provides a summary of the net positions of traders. 
15 For each commodity we 
report the average net long position by trader category, the standard deviation of the position, the 
percentage  of  the  months  the  position  is  long,  as  well  as  the  persistence  of  the  position  as 
measured by the first-order autocorrelation coefficient (rho). All positions are  measured  as a 
fraction of the total open interest in that commodity. The first observation about Table 9 is that 
commercials  are  on  average  net  short  in  most  markets,  while  non-commercials  and  non-
reportable  positions  are  on  average  net  long.  This  is  broadly  consistent  with  the  Keynesian 
hypothesis.  Exceptions include Corn, Feeder Cattle, Lean Hogs and Milk, where the average 
                                                 
12 In addition, the CFTC has a category of “non-reportable positions,” which includes either commercial or 
non-commercial positions that are below the reporting limits set by the CFTC. These would include either 
small  hedgers  or  speculators.    For  the  exact  definitions  see 
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/backgrounder/opacot596.htm. See also Ederington and Lee (2002) for a discussion 
about the accuracy of the classifications. 
13 See  also  Van  der  Goorbergh  (2004)  and  Szymanowska  (2006).    Bryant,  Bessler  and  Haigh  (2006) 
question the hedging pressure hypothesis. 
14 De Roon, et al (2000) is the only paper to examine the correlation between returns and ex-ante hedging 
pressure,  but  we  were  unable  to  qualitatively  replicate  their  results.    They  appear  to  be  studying  the 
contemporaneous correlation. Our results are similar to Wang (2003). 
15 The CFTC does not cover LME commodities, and there in insufficient data for Butter and Coal which are 
also excluded from Table 9.   24 
position of the commercials is net long. If all short positions were taken up by commercials, their 
average position would be 100% of the open interest. Instead, the average net short position of 
commercials across commodities is about 10%, which indicates that commercials are both long 
and  short  in  a  given  month.  In  addition,  the  table  shows  that  there  are  large  cross-sectional 
differences  in  net  positions  over  time:  the  average  standard  deviation  of  the  net  position  of 
commercials in column 4 of Table 9 is 15% per month. Also, there are large cross-sectional 
differences across commodities. For example, commercials in Oats and Platinum are short more 
than 90% of the months, while the Crude Oil and Corn commercials are almost equally likely to 
be long or short. Non-Reportable positions in Coffee are always net long, while non-reportable 
positions in Corn and Feeder Cattle are almost always short. Positions are uniformly persistent for 
all commodities: the first-order autocorrelations of the positions of commercials range from 0.59 
for Coffee to 0.92 for Palladium. It is notable that the non-reportable positions are on average net 
long in most contracts and for most of the time. A detailed explanation of these differences is 
beyond the scope of this paper as our main focus is on the question whether these positions 
predict risk premiums.  
Table  10  summarizes  the  results  of  regressions  of  futures  excess  returns  on  hedging 
pressure, defined as the net long position of commercials scaled by the open interest as in Table 
9. Hedging pressure enters this regression either contemporaneously or predictively: in the left 
columns of each panel the monthly futures return between t–1 and t are regressed on the hedging 
pressure measured at time t, in the right columns hedging pressure is measured at the at time t–1. 
A negative slope coefficient in the table means that an increase in hedging (decrease of long 
position) by commercials is associated with a higher futures return.  The results in Table 10 show 
that the slope coefficients are generally significantly negative when hedging pressure is measured 
at the end of the return interval (i.e., contemporaneously), but insignificantly different from zero 
when hedging pressure is measured at the beginning of the return interval (i.e., lagged). The R-
squared of the predictive regressions is on average below 1%, compared to 10% on average in the 
coincident regressions.  These results are therefore inconsistent with the hypothesis that hedging 
pressure is an important determinant of ex-ante risk premiums, and consistent with a story that 
traders adjust their positions as futures prices change.
16 In particular, the significantly negative 
slope  coefficients  in  the coincident  regressions  indicate  that  commercials  increase  their  short 
positions as prices go up, while non-commercials increase their long positions in a rising market. 
                                                 
16 We also conducted a sort of commodities into portfolios based on beginning of period hedging pressure, 
along the same lines as the portfolio sorts in tables 5-8. Unreported results show that we find no evidence 
that these sorts were informative about spreading futures risk premiums.   25 
This  would  make  non-commercials  appear  to  be  momentum  investors.  Indeed,  the  results  in 
Tables 7 and 8 which summarize the characteristics of portfolios sorted on prior futures or prior 
spot price returns indicate that non-commercials take larger long positions in high momentum 
commodities than in commodities with poor prior performance.  
The main conclusion of this section is that contrary to the existing literature, we find no 
evidence that supports a hedging pressure explanation for risk premiums in commodity futures 
markets.  Instead,  we  have  shown  that  risk  premiums  systematically  vary  with  the  state  of 
inventories, as predicted by the Theory of Storage. Two questions remain. First, does our single 
factor explanation capture most of the predictable variation of risk premiums? And second, can 
we reconcile these risk premiums with modern asset pricing theories of risk? 
Answering these questions is beyond the scope of the current paper, but we leave the 
reader with partial answers to these questions. We have shown that portfolios sorted on basis and 
momentum take positions in low inventories. If we regress the excess returns of High Basis 
portfolio on the excess return of the Low Inventories portfolio, we find a significant intercept of 
2.4% p.a. (t = 1.58). A similar regression of the excess returns of High Momentum portfolio on 
the excess returns of the Low Inventories portfolio has an intercept of 4.0% p.a. (t = 2.27). This 
suggests that there is an orthogonal component to the returns to basis and momentum portfolios 
that is not captured by variation of inventories. This may be due to a combination of noise in the 
measurement of inventories, or that our inventory sorts do not capture cross-sectional differences 
in inventory dynamics across commodities that are correlated with risk premiums. Alternatively, 
it may be due to an omitted risk factor that drives both the returns to basis and prior-return sorted 
portfolios.  If  we  run  a  regression  of  the  components  of  the  returns  to  basis  and  momentum 
portfolios that are orthogonal to inventories on each other, we find that the resulting intercept of 
that regression to be insignificantly different from zero, both economically as well as statistically. 
This  suggests  that  basis  and  momentum  portfolios  contain  a  common  source  of  risk  that  is 
orthogonal to variation in inventories, and is compensated for in average returns. We leave a full 
exploration of these issues to future research. 
 
7.  Summary and conclusions 
 
This  paper  examines  the  relationship  between  the  state  of  inventories  and  risk  premiums  of 
individual commodity futures, as predicted by the Modern Theory of Storage. For this purpose, 
we  collect  a  comprehensive  historical  monthly  dataset  of  inventories  for  31  individual 
commodities  over  a  37-year  period  between  1969  and  2006.  Our  major  findings  can  be   26 
summarized  as  follows.  First,  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  the  Theory  of  Storage,  we 
empirically document a negative, non-linear relationship between the futures basis (convenience 
yield) and the level of inventories: at low inventory levels the basis increases at an increasing 
rate. Second, we show that the state of inventories is informative about futures risk premiums. 
Although inventory data suffer from measurement error, we show that commodity futures and 
spot prices carry relevant information about the state of inventories that can be used to provide 
additional evidence about the role of inventories for futures risk premiums. In particular we show 
that prior futures returns, prior spot price changes and the futures basis are correlated with futures 
risk  premiums  as  predicted  by  the  Theory.  Finally,  we  distinguish  our  explanation  of  risk 
premiums from the Theory of Normal Backwardation, which – in its empirical implementation – 
attributes risk premiums to “hedging pressure” by Commercial hedgers. While the positions of 
participants in futures markets vary with both returns and the state of inventories, we find no 
evidence that the positions of futures traders predict risk premiums on commodity futures.    27 
Appendix A: Storage and Commodity Futures 
 
Deaton  and  Laroque  (1992)  present  an  infinite  horizon  model  of  intertemporal  inventory 
dynamics with risk neutral agents.  The goal of their model is to explain spot commodity price 
dynamics, in particular, the extreme volatility of spot commodity prices, and the prevalence of 
pronounced upward price spikes with no downward spikes, resulting in high positive skewness.  
The model is not about futures markets, and futures markets are not included.  In Section 1 of this 
Appendix we present a simple two period version of Deaton and Laroque.  In Section 2 we add a 
commodity futures market to the model.  
 
A1.  A Two-Period Deaton and Laroque Model 
 
There is a single good in the economy, the “commodity.” There are three dates, t=0, t=1, and t=2 
and two classes of agents in the economy. There are inventory holders who sell the commodity 
and  who  want  to  maximize  t=2  wealth,  denominated  in  dollars.  Inventory  holders  sell  the 
commodity to commodity buyers, who want units of the commodity and pay dollars to obtain 
these units. Commodity buyers’ preferences are defined over the commodity. 
 
We consider the storage decision of a representative, competitive, risk neutral, inventory holder. 
At t=0 the inventory holder has on hand an amount z0 of the single good in the economy. At t=1 
the inventory holder will receive a random endowment of the single good, z1, drawn from f(z), 
which has support  ] , [ z z . Commodity buyers’ demand for the commodity at dates 1 and 2 is 
summarized by D(p).  Prices at dates 1 and 2 are p0 and p1, respectively.  The price of the 
commodity is expressed in terms of dollars per unit of commodity. The demand function is a 
continuously  differentiable,  monotonically  decreasing  function  of  price.  There  is  a  constant 
returns to scale storage technology available to the inventory holder, but goods depreciate so that 
one unit stored at t=0 yields (1–δ) units at t=1, where 0<δ<1. The interest rate is zero. 
 
Before the t=0 goods market opens the inventory holder chooses an amount of inventory, I0, to 
carry over to t=1. So, at t=0 the amount available for sale in the commodity market is z0 – I0.  At 
t=1, the inventory holder receives the realization z1 and so the amount available for sale in the 
t=1 goods market is z1 + I0(1–δ). 
 
At  t=0  the  representative  inventory  holder  chooses  I0,  taking  prices  as  given,  to  maximize 
expected dollar profits: 
Max Π0 = p0(z0  – I0) + E[p1(z1 + I0(1 – δ))]    s.t. I0 ≥ 0.             (A1) 
Deaton and Laroque emphasize the constraint that the inventory must be nonnegative, i.e., goods 
from the future, t=1 (z1), cannot be sold earlier, at t=0.  For example, if z0 is very low, e.g., zero, 
then the inventory holder would like to sell more at t=0, but cannot. 
An equilibrium is a set of prices, p0 and p1 such that (i) the goods markets at t=0 and t=1, 
respectively, clear; and (ii) the inventory holders’ profits are maximal. Deaton and Laroque point 
out that profit maximization implies the following “no arbitrage” conditions: 
  I0 = 0 if (1 – δ)E(p1) < p0  
  I0 ≥ 0 if (1 – δ)E(p1) = p0.   28 
In  words,  inventories,  I0,  are  zero  if there  is  an  expected  loss from  holding  them.  Inventory 
holders  will  hold  inventory  only  if  there  is  an  expected  profit  from  doing  so,  and  they  will 
increase their holdings until current and future expected prices are equated.
17 Deaton and Laroque 
combine the above “no arbitrage” profit maximization conditions with market clearing to obtain 
an expression for the equilibrium price process (in an infinite horizon setting).  They then prove 
that there exists a unique rational expectations price function. 
We  proceed  to  solve  for  the  equilibrium  in  a  different  way,  with  an  eye  toward  adding  a 
commodity futures market in the next section.  Solving recursively, consider the goods market at 
t=1.  At that date there are no decisions to be made, as this is the last goods market and so there is 
no point to storing goods any further. The inventory holder simply puts all his remaining goods 
on the market. Market clearing implies: 
  D(p1) = z1 + (1 – δ)I0. 
This determines the equilibrium price (inverse demand) as:  ) ) 1 ( ( 0 1 1
*
1 I z p d - + G = . 
Now we turn to date t=0.  The market at this date must also clear, for any level of commodity 
inventory chosen by the inventory holder. So, for given I0: 
  D(p0) = z0 - I0, 
which  yields  the  equilibrium  price  (inverse  demand)  in  the  first  commodity  market 
) ( 0 0 0
*
0 I z p - G = . For equilibrium prices we will use the notation Γ0 and Γ1, suppressing the 
arguments of these functions unless needed for clarity.  Note that Γ0 and Γ1 are continuously 
differentiable, monotonically decreasing functions of the quantity supplied on the market. 
Substituting the market-clearing equilibrium prices into the inventory decision problem at t=0, the 
inventory holder chooses I0 to maximize: 
Max Π0 = Γ0 (z0  – I0) + E[Γ1 (z1 + I0(1 – δ))]     s.t. I0 ≥ 0 
where the arguments of the equilibrium price functions Γ0 and  Γ1 have been suppressed. 
Since the representative inventory holder is a price taker, the first order condition is: 
  E[Γ1 (1 – δ)] =  Γ0 - λ                           (A2) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity constraint on I0.  E(*) is the expectation 
operator taken over uncertainty with respect to z1.  
If the non-negativity constraint is binding, then I0 = 0.  Otherwise, λ = 0 and there is a positive 
amount of inventory carried forward.  In other words, equation (A2) results in the same Deaton 
and Laroque arbitrage conditions for inventories. So, the solution to (A2) gives the equilibrium 
value of I0 as a function of the market clearing prices. Substituting that value into the market 
                                                 
17 Like Deaton and Laroque, we ignore any exogenously assumed “convenience yields.” Routledge, Seppi, 
and Spatt (2000) show how the nonnegativity constraint leads to an endogenous convenience yield in the 
Deaton and Laroque model with risk neutral futures traders.   29 
clearing  price  equations  determines  the  prices.    This  completes  the  determination  of  the 
equilibrium.
18 
Deaton and Laroque (1992) also prove that the variance of Γ1 is decreasing in I0 and increasing in 
Γ0, a result that will be important below.
19 
A2.  Storage Dynamics and Commodity Futures 
We now introduce a commodity futures market which opens at t=0 and settles at t=1.  The futures 
exchange specifies that one unit of the good corresponds to one futures contract. In the futures 
market  at  t=0  there  is  a  price  $F  at  which  the  two  trading  parties  agree  to  trade.  F  will  be 
determined in equilibrium. The parties agree at t=0 that the “long” investor will pay $F per 
contract to the “short” investor at t=1. In exchange, the short investor agrees at t=0 to deliver one 
unit of the commodity to the long investor at t=1 for each contract entered into at t=0. 
We assume that futures contracts must be fully collateralized for the “long” investor, so that a 
purchase of N futures contracts at price $F, per contract, requires $NF to be set aside in an 
account at the futures exchange at t=0.
20  
We also now introduce a large number of competitive, risk averse, speculators, each with utility 
defined over second period wealth (measured in dollars), U(W), where U’>0 and U’’<0. Each 
speculator receives an endowment of e0 dollars at date t=0. 
At t=0 the representative speculator chooses a futures position N
LF by “going long” N
L futures 
contracts.  Settlement in the futures market occurs at t=1 just before trade in the second period 
goods market. So, the long investor will take delivery of N units of the commodity and sell that 
amount in the goods market, receiving dollars. The risk faced by the long investor is that the price 
of  the  commodity  in  the  second  period  commodity  market  is  low,  exactly  the  risk  that  the 
inventory holder seeks to hedge. 
 
Inventory  holders  have  a  hedging  demand,  N
S,  because  we  now  assume  that  they  face  a 
bankruptcy cost. That is, inventory holders want to go “short” futures in order to hedge the price 
risk  emanating  from  the  randomness  of  z1.  For  simplicity,  we  write  the  bankruptcy  cost  in 
reduced form as the function g(z1, I0, NF), where the first partial derivatives are all negative, i.e., 
the likelihood of incurring the bankruptcy cost is declining as z1, I0, or hedging increase. I0 and N 
are  endogenous  choice  variables  of  the  inventory  holder,  while  z1  is  an  exogenous  variable 
realized at t=1. The price F is determined in equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume that all 
second derivatives and cross partials are zero.
21 
 
Implicitly, bankruptcy corresponds to second period profits falling below a threshold (a debt 
level). Since the only source of uncertainty is z1, bankruptcy corresponds to a realized value of z1 
below a critical value. That critical value depends on I0 and the amount of hedging. Intuitively, 
the risk faced by the inventory holder is that the z1 realization is low. Holding a higher level of 
inventory, I0, serves as a buffer against this possibility.  Similarly, the futures market provides a 
                                                 
18 See Deaton and Laroque (1992) for a formal derivation. 
19  See Lemma 4 in the Appendix of Deaton and Laroque (1992), p. 22. 
20 We assume fully collateralized futures for long investors for simplicity.  The alternative is to impose a 
bankruptcy cost and associated constraint that takes into account the possibility that a futures long investor 
might not be able to honor the futures contract at t=1. 
21 Without this assumption further assumptions would have to be made about the size of these effects, in the 
proof of the proposition below.   30 
way to hedge this risk. Thus, we intentionally omit details, but assume that bankruptcy is less 
likely to occur to the extent that the inventory holder has more inventory to sell in the second 
market and has hedged the price risk associated with second period sales. 
The bankruptcy cost is to be thought of as a reduced form for a variety of motivations for firms to 
hedge that have been discussed in the literature.
22 Our goal is only to provide a parsimonious 
motivation for a hedging demand. 
Discussion of the Model 
Futures contracts are not redundant in the model, as inventory holders’ behavior will change, in 
that their intertemporal allocation of goods between periods one and two will differ from the case 
where there is bankruptcy cost and no futures markets, and the case where there are bankruptcy 
costs and there is a futures market.  The likelihood of incurring the bankruptcy cost declines if 
inventories are higher, but it may be cheaper to hedge the bankruptcy risk in the futures market 
rather than increase inventories. In the presence of the bankruptcy cost, the futures market is 
welfare improving, although we cannot formally demonstrate this because the agents demanding 
the goods in the two periods are not formally modeled. 
Also, note that the inventory holder is engaged in “cost-of-carry arbitrage.”  If holding inventory 
until next period, and foregoing this period’s price while incurring the depreciation cost, is lower 
than the expected price next period, then the inventory holder should engage in that transaction – 
except that the expected bankruptcy cost must be taken into account.  There are no agents in the 
model who can engage in cost of carry arbitrage without facing the expected bankruptcy cost.  
The speculators are a distinct group from the agents who are implicitly modeled by the demand 
functions each period.  Again, this is for simplicity.  As will be seen, it allows for goods market to 
clear independently of the speculators’ behavior. 
The risk faced by a long investor in the futures market is the price risk of the second period goods 
market, where the long investor sells goods received to settle the futures contracts. We leave open 
the question of whether this risk is systematic or idiosyncratic, but we assume that the risk averse 
speculator cannot diversify this risk.  
Equilibrium with a Futures Market 
At t=0 the (representative) speculator uses some of his endowment to “buy” $N
LF futures, i.e., N
L 
contracts  each  at  price  $F.  Recall  that,  by  assumption,  his  futures  position  must  be  fully 
collateralized. He sets that amount aside as collateral (at the futures exchange), leaving him with 
e0 – N
LF dollars at t=0 which he stores until t=1. In equilibrium N
L = N
S
;  we sometimes omit the 
superscript. At t=1 he receives his collateral back, but uses that to settle his futures position. He 
pays NF dollars and receives N units of the commodity, which he can sell in the goods market at  
the equilibrium price of Γ1 per unit, i.e., N Γ1  is the value of what he receives. Summarizing, at 
t=1 his wealth is: 
W = (e0 – NF) + NΓ1 = e0 + N(Γ1 – F). 
Let N
L be the number of futures contracts the speculator is willing to go long at t=0 at price F.  
Then at t=0 the speculator’s problem is to choose N
L to: 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Getzy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) and Graham and Smith (1999).   31 
Max E[U(W)] s.t. W = e0 + N
L(Γ1 – F). 
The first order condition is: 




U E           (A3) 
Note that Γ1 – F is the (realized) risk premium on the futures position. If things go well for the 
futures investor, this will be positive, but the futures position is risky and this term might turn out 
to be negative. The first order condition values the risk premium with the pricing kernel U’ 
(which here is trivial as it is a one-period problem). The first order condition makes clear that the 
speculator must be rewarded for taking risk, as the utility function is concave. He increases his 
futures position until there is no further expected gain to doing so. 
 
Turning to the inventory holder, let N
S be the number of contracts the inventory holder is willing 
to go short at t=0.  This is the number of units of the commodity that the inventory holder must 
deliver to physically settle his futures position at maturity, t=1. In exchange, he receives $NF. 
The inventory holder chooses I0 and N
D to: 
Max Π0 = p 0(z0  - I0) + E[p1(z1 + I0(1 – δ)-N
S) + N
SF] – E[g(z1, I0, N
SF)] 
 s.t. I0 ≥ 0.               
A Rational Expectations Equilibrium is a set of prices Γ0, Γ1 and F such that: (i) the goods 
markets at t=0 and t=1 clear; (ii) the futures market at t=0 clears, i.e., N
L = N
S = N; (iii) inventory 
profits are maximal; and (iv), the speculator’s utility is maximal. 
As before, we start at t=1. The amount supplied in the second period goods market consists of the 
inventory holder’s final inventory, net of what was used to settle his futures position, z1 + (1 – 
δ)I0 – N, plus the amount of goods delivered to the speculator in the futures market, N. So the 
goods market clearing condition is: 
  D(p1) = z1 + [(1 – δ)I0 – N] + N = z1 + [(1– δ)I0 ≡ I1, 
which yields  ) ( 1 1 1 I p G =
+ (i.e., the inverse of the demand function).   
Given I0 and the initial endowment, z0, at t=0 the goods market clears if: 
  D(p0) = z0 – I0, 
which implies that  ) ( 0 0 0 0 I z p - G =
+ is the equilibrium price. As above, we will use the notation 
Γ0 and Γ1 for equilibrium prices, respectively, suppressing the arguments of these functions. 
 
Given the equilibrium prices in the goods markets, Γ0 and Γ1, respectively, at t=0 the price-taking 
inventory holder chooses I0 and N
S to: 
Max Π0 = Γ0 (z0  – I0) + E[Γ1 (z1 + I0(1 – δ) – N
S) + N
SF] – E[g(z1, I0, N
SF)] 
s.t. I0 ≥ 0.                 32 
The first order conditions with respect to I0 and N
D, respectively, are: 
  ) ' ( 0 )] 1 ( 1 [








,                (A5) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity constraint on inventories.  Recall that the 
partial derivatives of the bankruptcy function are negative, i.e., expected marginal bankruptcy 
costs are decreasing if inventories or hedging increase. 
Equation (A4) alters the Deaton and Laroque “no arbitrage” condition. Now there is an incentive 
to hedge against the bankruptcy cost even if expected profits from carrying inventory are negative 
at the margin.  Holding more in inventory makes incurring the bankruptcy cost less likely.  If 
there is an interior solution where I0>0, then λ=0, which will henceforth assume is the case.  
Equation  (A5)  expresses  the  risk  transfer  function  of  the  futures  market.  The  expected  risk 
premium, earned by the speculator, is E[Γ1 – F].  Since the right-hand side of (A5) is positive (the 
partial derivative is negative), the expected risk premium paid to the speculator, E[Γ1 – F], is 
positive. However, the inventory holder does not mind if the risk premium is expected to be 
positive, i.e., an expected net positive payment to the speculators, because it helps reduce the 
expected bankruptcy cost.  It is also instructive to write (A5) as: 
 








Since the partial derivative is negative, it is clear that in equilibrium (i.e., evaluating (A5) at the 
equilibrium  values)  F  will  be  set  at  a  discount  to  the  expected  future  spot  price,  where  the 
discount  is  a  function  of  the  expected  bankruptcy  cost.  In  this  sense,  the  model  displays 
Keynesian “normal backwardation.” 
We  have  already  determined  the  market  clearing  goods prices,  as  functions  of  the  inventory 
decision,  I0,  an  endogenous  variable.  Equation  (A4)  determines  the  equilibrium  level  of 
inventories,  I0. The  futures  market  must  also  clear,  i.e.,  N
L  =N
S=N.    The  supply  of  futures 
contracts is determined by equation (A3) and the demand for futures contracts is determined by 
equation (A5). Equation (A3) (substituting in the equilibrium value Γ1) and equation (A5) jointly 
clear the futures market by determining N and F. Solving (A5) for F and substituting into (A3), 
eliminating F,  gives an expression implicitly determining the equilibrium N: 
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This completes determination of the equilibrium. 
Some Results 
The source of the risk premium in the futures market is the risk premium in the spot market.  
Comparing  the  inventory  holder’s  first  order  conditions  (A2)  and  (A4),  it  is  clear  that  the 
inventory holder requires a higher expected return on holding inventory intertemporally due to   33 
the presence of the bankruptcy cost. Just as the equity risk premium is inherited by S&P futures, 
so the commodity futures inherit the risk premium in the spot commodity prices. 
The  fundamental  state  variable  of  commodity  futures  is  the  level  of  inventories.  To  see  this 
consider a reduction in inventories due to an exogenous shock (alternatively this can be thought 
of as an exogenous change in net demand), i.e., z0, is reduced. When this occurs the expected risk 
premium rises. The result of Deaton and Laroque that the variance of Γ1 is decreasing in I0 and 
increasing in Γ0 still holds. Since the variance of the second period spot price (the risk borne by 
the long investors and shed by the short investors) increases when inventories go down, the 
expected risk premium in the futures market (the compensation paid to the long investor by the 
short investor) rises.  This can be seen from the demand for the long position, N
L
, by the investors 
(Equation (A3)), and the demand to short, N
S, by the inventory holders (Equation (A5)).  This is 
shown in the figure below. 
 
But,  note  that  while  the  expected  risk  premium  rises  when  inventories  fall,  the  equilibrium 
number of futures contracts, N, may rise or fall (though the figure shows N rising). This depends 
on the relative curvature of the demand and supply functions for long and short futures positions. 
This ambiguity will be important when we analyze the positions of traders in the main text. 
When inventories, z0, decline, the basis, Γ0 – F, increases.  To see this first notice that we have the 
following results due to the properties of the inverse demand function: 
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So, Γ0 increases. Then for the basis to increase when inventories decline, either F must go down 




dE .  Looking at equation (A5), 
N 
N
L: Eq. (A3) 
N
S: Eq. (A5) 
The Expected Risk Premium Rises When Inventories Fall 
F
F E ] [ 1 - G  34 
we can see what happens to F in equilibrium when z0 declines.  Since the bankruptcy costs 
display  constant  marginal  costs  (by  assumption),  F  must  also  go  down  when  I0  goes  down.  
Equation  (A4)  determines  the  equilibrium  level  of  inventories.    Note  that  it  depends  on  the 
equilibrium number of futures contracts and on the equilibrium futures price because those are 
arguments of the g function. The total differential is: 
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which implies that  0
0
0 > z













z . This shows 
that the basis widens when inventories go down. 
As in RSS (2000), there is an endogenous implied “convenience yield” that arises just as RSS 
showed.   35 
Appendix B: Inventory Data 
 
1.  Aluminum: Source: London Metals Exchange: “Warehouse stocks.”  Start date: 12/29/1978. 
Periodicity: daily. 
 
2.  Butter: Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture: “Commercial stocks of butter in the U.S. on 
first of the month in thousands of pounds.”  Start date: 12/31/1969. Periodicity: monthly. 
Data to 12/31/2004 is compiled in an Excel table by Economic Research Services (ERS-
USDA) from National Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS-USDA) data. Then, the data is 
taken directly from NASS-USDA monthly Cold Storage reports. Data as of the first of the 
month is shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
3.  Coal:  Department  of  Energy:  Monthly  Energy  Review:  “U.S.  Coal  stocks.”  Start  date: 
03/31/1999. Periodicity: monthly.  At the time of writing, the data was not available for 
December 2006.  The value for this month is assumed to be equal to the November 2006 
value. 
 
4.  Cocoa: Source: New York Board of Trade, sum of three series: “Visible stocks of cocoa in 
New York warehouses” (thousands of bags), same for Philadelphia warehouses and for Port 
of Hampton Road warehouses.  Data to 04/30/1999 is 1000 times the monthly series of the 
same data compiled by Commodity Research Bureau (CRB Yearbooks CD) in millions of 
bags and rounded to one decimal place. Start date: 1/31/1931.  Periodicity: monthly. 
 
5.  Coffee: Source: New York Board of Trade: “Exchange warehouse stocks, 60 kg bags.”  Start 
date: 1/31/1983. Periodicity: monthly. 
 
6.  Copper: Source: London Metals Exchange. Start date: 1/2/1970.  Periodicity: daily. 
 
7.  Corn:  Source:  USDA  Livestock  and  Seed  Division,  Portland  OR.  “Stocks  of  Grain  at 
Selected  Terminals  and  Elevator  Sites,  thousands  of  bushels.”  Start  date:  06/25/1974. 
Periodicity: weekly. 
 
8.  Cotton: Source: New York Board of Trade: “Certificated Warehouse Stocks, 480 lb bales.”  
Start date: 12/31/1989. Periodicity: weekly. 
 
9.  Crude Oil: Source: Department of Energy: Monthly Energy Review “U.S. crude oil ending 
stocks non-SPR, thousands of barrels.” Start date: 1/31/1945. Periodicity: monthly. 
 
10. Feeder  Cattle: For Feeder Cattle, we do not use the available inventory series which is 
quarterly.  Instead we use 3-month-ahead values of the Live Cattle inventory for the current 
monthly level of Feeder Cattle, under the assumption that it takes three months to feed calves 
to  create  what  are  called  Feeder  Cattle.  Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture:  “Cold 
storage holdings of frozen beef in the U.S. on first of the month in thousands of pounds.”  
Start date: 12/31/1969. Periodicity: monthly. Data to 12/31/2004 is compiled in an Excel 
table  by  Economic  Research  Services  (ERS-USDA)  from  National  Agricultural  Statistics 
Services (NASS-USDA) data. Then, the data is taken directly from NASS-USDA monthly 
Cold Storage reports. Data as of the first of the month is shifted to the end of previous month 
and then shifted 3 months forward to account for the average time feeder cattle spends in 
feedlots.   
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11. Heating Oil: Department of Energy: Monthly Energy Review “U.S. total distillate stocks.” 
Start date: 1/31/1945.  Periodicity: monthly. 
 
12. Lead:  Source:  London  Metals  Exchange:  “Warehouse  stocks.”    Start  date:  1/2/1970. 
Periodicity: daily. 
 
13. Lean Hogs: Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture: “Cold storage holdings of frozen pork 
in the U.S. on first of the month in thousands of pounds.”  Start date: 12/31/1969. Periodicity: 
monthly. Data to 12/31/2004 is compiled in an Excel table by Economic Research Services 
(ERS-USDA) from National Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS-USDA) data. Then, the 
data is taken directly from NASS-USDA monthly Cold Storage reports. Data as of the first of 
the month is shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
14. Live Cattle: Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture: “Cold storage holdings of frozen beef 
in the U.S. on first of the month in thousands of pounds.”  Start date: 12/31/1969. Periodicity: 
monthly. Data to 12/31/2004 is compiled in an Excel table by Economic Research Services 
(ERS-USDA) from National Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS-USDA) data. Then, the 
data is taken directly from NASS-USDA monthly Cold Storage reports. Data as of the first of 
the month is shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
15. Lumber: American Forest & Paper Association:  “Stocks (gross) of softwood in the United 
States, on the first of the month, in millions of board feet.” Data compiled by Commodity 
Research  Bureau  (CRB  Yearbooks  CD)  and  rounded  to  one  decimal  place.  Start  date: 
12/31/1969.  Periodicity: monthly. Data as of the first of the month is shifted to the end of 
previous month.  At the time of writing, data were not available for June 2006 to December 
2006.  The values for those months are assumed to be the same as the May 2006 value. 
 
16. Milk: Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture: “Commercial stocks of milk in the U.S. on 
first of the month in thousands of pounds.”  Start date: 12/31/1969. Periodicity: monthly. 
Data compiled in an Excel table by Economic Research Services (ERS-USDA) from National 
Agricultural  Statistics  Services  (NASS-USDA)  data.  Data  as  of  the  first  of  the  month  is 
shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
17. Natural Gas: Department of Energy: Monthly Energy Review: “U.S. total natural gas in 
underground storage (working gas), millions of cubic feet.” Start date: 9/30/1975. Periodicity: 
monthly. 
 
18. Nickel:    Source:  London  Metals  Exchange:  “Warehouse  stocks.”  Start  date:  7/13/1979. 
Periodicity: daily. 
 
19. Oats:  Source:  USDA  Livestock  and  Seed  Division,  Portland  OR.  “Stocks  of  Grain  at 
Selected  Terminals  and  Elevator  Sites,  thousands  of  bushels.”  Start  date:  06/25/1974. 
Periodicity: weekly.  
 
20. Orange Juice: Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture: “Cold storage stocks of orange juice 
concentrate in the U.S., millions of pounds.”  Start date: 12/31/1969. Periodicity: monthly. 
Data to 12/31/2004 is compiled by Commodity Research Bureau (CRB Yearbooks CD) from 
National Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS-USDA) data and rounded to 1 decimal place. 
Then, the data is taken directly from NASS-USDA monthly Cold Storage reports. Data as of 
the first of the month is shifted to the end of previous month. 
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21. Palladium:    Source:  New  York  Mercantile  Exchange:  “Warehouse  stocks.”  Start  date: 
10/31/1995. Periodicity: daily. 
 
22. Platinum:    Source:  New  York  Mercantile  Exchange:  “Warehouse  stocks.”  Start  date: 
10/31/1995. Periodicity: daily. 
 
23. Pork Bellies: Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture: “Frozen pork belly storage stocks in 
the United States, on first of the month, in thousands of pounds.”  Start date: 12/31/1969. 
Periodicity:  monthly.  Data  to  12/31/2004  is  compiled  in  an  Excel  table  by  Economic 
Research  Services  (ERS-USDA)  from  National  Agricultural  Statistics  Services  (NASS-
USDA)  data.  Then,  the  data  is  taken  directly  from  NASS-USDA  monthly  Cold  Storage 
reports. Data as of the first of the month is shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
24. Propane: Source: Department of Energy: Monthly Energy Review: “U.S. ending stocks of 
Propane/Propylene, thousands of barrels.”  Start date: 1/31/1971.  Periodicity: monthly. 
 
25. Soybeans: Source: USDA Livestock and Seed Division, Portland OR. “Stocks of Grain at 
Selected  Terminals  and  Elevator  Sites,  Thousands  of  Bushels”.  Start  date:  06/25/1974. 
Periodicity: weekly. From 12/31/1961 to 05/31/1974 1000 * monthly series of the same data 
compiled (in millions of bushels) by Commodity Research Bureau (CRB Yearbooks CD) and 
rounded to 1 decimal place as “Commercial stocks of soybeans in the United States, on the 
first month, in millions of bushels.” and shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
26. Soybean Oil: Source: Economic Research Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture: “Stocks 
of soybean oil (crude and refined) at factories and warehouses in the United States on the first 
of  month,  millions  of  pounds.  Data  compiled  by  Commodity  Research  Bureau  (CRB 
Yearbooks CD) and rounded to 1 decimal place. Start date: 9/30/1970.  Periodicity: monthly. 
Data as of the first of the month is shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
27. Soybean  Meal:  Source:  Economic  Research  Services,  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture: 
“Stocks, including mill feed and lecithin of soybean cake and meal at oil mills in the United 
States on the first of the month in thousands of short tons.” Data compiled by Commodity 
Research  Bureau  (CRB  Yearbooks  CD)  and  rounded  to  1  decimal  place.  Start  date: 
9/30/1970.  Periodicity: monthly. Data as of the first of the month is shifted to the end of 
previous month. 
 
28. Tin:  Source:  London  Metals  Exchange:  “Warehouse  stocks.”    Start  date:  1/2/1970. 
Periodicity: daily. Gap in the data from Jan. 1986 – 6/30/1989 during the suspension of 
trading due to tin crisis. Contract resumed trading in June 1989, but it took another 12 months 
or  so  for  warehouse  stocks  to  rise  from  extremely  low  levels.  We  only  used  data  from 
6/30/1990. 
 
29. Unleaded Gas: Source: Department of Energy: Monthly Energy Review: “U.S. total motor 
gasoline ending stocks, thousands of barrels.” Start date: 3/31/1981. Periodicity: monthly. 
 
30. Wheat:  Source:  USDA  Livestock  and  Seed  Division,  Portland  OR.  “Stocks  of  Grain  at 
Selected  Terminals  and  Elevator  Sites,  Thousands  of  Bushels”.  Start  date:  06/25/1974. 
Periodicity: weekly. From 06/30/1970 to 05/31/1974 1000 * monthly series of the same data 
compiled (in millions of bushels) by Commodity Research Bureau (CRB Yearbooks CD) and 
rounded to 1 decimal place as “Commercial stocks of domestic wheat in the United States, on 
the first month, in millions of bushels of domestic wheat in storage in public and private   38 
elevators in 39 markets and wheat afloat in vessels or barges at lake and seaboard ports, the 
first Saturday of the month.” and shifted to the end of previous month. 
 
31. Zinc:  Source:  London  Metals  Exchange:  “Warehouse  stocks.”    Start  date:  1/2/1970. 
Periodicity: daily. 
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Appendix C: Details of Estimation Procedures 
 
This appendix is in two parts, describing the procedures for calculating two sorts of statistics 
employed in the paper. The first part concerns the t-statistics for the mean.  It has two paragraphs. 
The first, which is about the t-statistics for scalar time series with serial correlation (shown in 
Tables 5-8), is fairly standard, but is described here for completeness and as a lead-in to the 
second paragraph, where calculation of the t-statistics for the difference in the two sample means  
(shown in Figure 3) is discussed.  The second part is about the standard errors and t-statistics of 
the pooled OLS coefficients on an unbalanced panel when the errors are serially correlated.  The 
t-values based on those standard errors appear in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
C1. t-statistics for the Mean of a Serially Correlated Series 










 be the sample mean.  
We wish to calculate the t-statistics for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean of the 
series is zero.  Under suitable assumptions (see, e.g., Hayashi (2000, Chapter 6.5)), we can show 
that, under the null, 
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Under suitable conditions, this is a consistent estimator of ) ( Avar y .  Therefore, we have a t-ratio 
for the sample mean that is asymptotically standard normal: 
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This is the t-statistics displayed in Tables 5-8. 
 
The t-statistics graphed in Figure 3 in red is the t-statistics for the following difference in the 
sample means created by two time series } , { t t z x : 
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(In Panel A of Figure 3, for example,  t x  is the basis and  t z  is the normalized inventory.)  So, as 
in the previous paragraph, the difference in sample means can be written as a sample average of a 
given series t y .  However, since each observation of the series  } { t y  here depends on a common 
random variablem ˆ , the long-run variance of the sample mean of  t y  will involve the asymptotic 
variance of  m ˆ  if  m ˆ  converges to its population mean  m  only at the usual rate of  n .  We   40 
ignore this possible complication by assuming that the convergence of  m ˆ  is faster than  n .  
This is a reasonable assumption to make in the context of Figure 3 because by construction  t z  
(the normalized inventory) is above 1 for almost half the time. 
 
 
C2. Calculating Standard Errors of pooled OLS Estimates 
 
The system of equations estimated in Tables 3 and 4 can be written as 
  ) ,..., 2 , 1 ; ,..., 2 , 1 (       n t M m z y mt mt mt = = + ¢ = e d              (C1) 
where  t  denotes  the  period  and  m  denotes  the  commodity,  with  M  being  the  number  of 
commodities.   mt z   ) 1 ( ´ L  is the L-dimensional vector of regressors in the m-th equation for 
period  t.    In  the  case  of  Table  3,  for  example,  mt z  consists  of  16  variables:  the  12  monthly 
dummies,  mt x , 
2
mt x , 
3
mt x , and  } 1 { 1 ) 1 (
3 > - mt mt x x , where  mt x  is the ratio of actual to normal 
inventory level for commodity m at the end of month t.  For now, assume the sample is a balanced 
panel in that  ) , ( mt mt z y  is observable for any pair  ) , ( t m . 
 
The pooled OLS estimator of d  is 
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Under  suitable  conditions  (stated  in,  e.g.,  Hayashi  (2000,  Chapter  6.5)),  ) ˆ ( d d - n  has  a 
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.  It can be expressed as:   41 
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where  j G  is the j-th order autocovariance matrix of  } { t g : 
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Since  } { t g  is as in (4) above, the autocovariance  j G  is a partitioned matrix given by: 
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That is, the (m,h) block of  j G  is the L L ´  matrix  , , E( ) mt h t j mt h t j z z e e - - ¢ . 
 
The Newey-West estimator of Avar( ) g  is 
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where  ˆ
j G  is  a  consistent  estimate  of  j G  to  be  specified  below.  The  parameter  q  in  (C9)  is 
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The (asymptotic) standard error of the pooled OLS estimate is the square root of 
1
n
 times the 
corresponding diagonal element of this matrix.  The t-value is the ratio of the point estimate to 
this standard error. 
 
To calculate  ) ˆ ( Est.Avar d , we need to estimate $
j G 's, which are ML ML ´  matrixes of fourth 
moments.    For  the  case  of  the  Metals  group  in  Table  3,  we  have  8 M =  and  16 L = ,  so 
128 ML = . The finite-sample property of the t-value might be better if we impose conditional 
homoskedasticity  of  the  errors  (so  , , , E( , ) E( ) mt h t j mt h t j mt h t j z z e e e e - - - = ).    Under  conditional 
homoskedasticity, we can write   j G  in (8) as products of second moments: 
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G = .                (C11) 
The  natural  estimator  of  this,  which  replaces  population  means  by  sample  means  and  the 
unobserved error terms by pooled OLS residuals, is 
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where $
mt e  is the pooled OLS residual 
  $ $
mt mt mt y z e d ¢ º - . 
To recapitulate, for balanced panels, the pooled OLS point estimate is (C2) and its asymptotic 
variance   ) ˆ ( Est.Avar d  is estimated by (C10) with  ) ( Est.Avar g  given by (C9) and (C12). 
 
We now turn to our treatment of missing observations.  In the case of Tables 3 and 4, the period 
from which ( , ) mt mt y z  is observable depends on m.  That is, ( , ) mt mt y z  is observable only for 
( ), ( ) 1,..., t s m s m n = + ,  where  ( ) s m  is  the  first  period  of  observation.  The  sample  is  an 
unbalanced panel in this sense.  The pooled OLS estimator pools all the available observations in 
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The expression for  ) ˆ ( Est.Avar d  is similarly modified so that the averages over t are averages 
over available terms.  Thus, (C10) becomes 
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and (C12) becomes 
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where  ( , , ) max{ ( ), ( ) } N m h j s m s h j = + .   43 
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Table 1: Summary of Commodity Futures Returns 1969/12-2006/12 
 
The table summarizes the average excess returns to individual commodity futures, expressed as percent per annum.  
Column 3 gives the first month of the sample period for the commodity in question. Column 4 gives the number of 
monthly observations in the sample, followed by the arithmetic and geometric average returns. The next columns 
give the annualized volatility (defined as the standard deviation of monthly excess return multiplied by the square 
root of 12), skewness, and kurtosis of the monthly return distribution, followed by the average pair-wise correlation 
with the other sample commodities and an equally-weighted index that includes all commodities. The final column 
gives the average futures basis, measured as the percentage difference between the nearest and next-to-maturity 
futures contracts and expressed as a percent per annum. 
 
Commodity  
Group  Commodity  Start  N  Arithm 
Mean 
Geom. 







Index  Index  196912  444  5.48   4.58   13.5  0.91  8.71  0.40  1.00  -2.10  
Copper  196912  444  7.77   4.06   27.7  0.77  6.10  0.19  0.40  0.37  
Platinum  199510  134  12.82   11.28   17.6  -0.16  2.83  0.12  0.33  2.59  
Palladium  199510  134  13.41   6.76   37.2  0.60  4.89  0.09  0.25  -0.11  
Zinc  198901  215  3.77   1.17   23.2  0.71  4.21  0.14  0.35  -3.51  
Lead  198901  215  4.90   2.18   23.7  0.69  4.05  0.11  0.28  -3.22  
Nickel  198802  226  16.65   9.37   41.5  3.06  25.99  0.14  0.40  2.67  
Aluminum  198806  222  -2.06   -3.93   19.3  -0.11  4.03  0.16  0.41  -4.09  
Metals 
Tin  199007  197  4.11   2.39   18.9  0.88  5.76  0.14  0.37  -1.54  
Cotton  198912  204  -4.10   -7.64   26.7  0.27  3.46  0.08  0.22  -7.30  
Cocoa  196912  444  5.94   0.89   32.5  0.83  4.62  0.07  0.27  -1.86  
Sugar  198912  204  6.78   2.71   28.6  0.09  3.20  0.07  0.20  3.18  
OJ  196912  444  4.58   0.11   31.3  2.01  14.87  0.03  0.16  -3.97  
Lumber  197010  434  0.50   -3.95   30.0  0.42  4.34  0.09  0.19  -7.61  
Softs 
Coffee  198301  287  2.17   -4.95   38.9  1.09  5.71  0.07  0.21  -5.83  
Wheat  197006  438  -0.80   -3.84   25.0  0.79  5.91  0.15  0.52  -5.02  
Corn  197406  390  -5.42   -8.06   23.4  1.12  9.34  0.18  0.57  -9.76  
Soybeans  196912  444  3.31   -0.52   28.6  1.70  13.54  0.20  0.70  -2.80  
Soybean Oil  197009  435  7.49   2.46   33.1  1.64  9.79  0.16  0.60  0.02  
Soybean Meal  197009  435  6.80   1.46   34.6  2.55  21.08  0.18  0.65  -0.72  
Oats  197406  390  -2.02   -6.77   32.6  2.83  27.67  0.13  0.49  -7.91  
Grains 
Rough Rice  198708  232  -6.35   -10.48   29.4  1.19  8.40  0.07  0.18  -13.06  
Pork Bellies  196912  444  1.77   -5.36   38.3  0.58  4.41  0.13  0.44  4.58  
Live Cattle  196912  444  6.37   4.61   18.7  -0.23  4.49  0.14  0.44  1.33  
Lean Hogs  196912  444  7.54   3.81   27.4  0.15  4.35  0.15  0.50  -5.86  
Feeder Cattle  197211  409  2.87   1.37   17.2  -0.53  5.74  0.08  0.32  1.55  
Milk  199701  119  5.14   1.34   28.2  0.87  5.46  0.05  0.12  1.16  
Meats 
Butter  199709  111  11.03   4.78   36.1  0.68  5.40  0.03  0.11  -7.18  
Heating Oil  197911  325  9.00   4.44   30.7  0.62  4.66  0.15  0.45  2.24  
Crude Oil  198403  273  14.47   8.98   33.7  0.60  5.83  0.13  0.47  5.81  
Gasoline  198512  252  18.35   12.24   36.0  0.90  5.71  0.14  0.51  7.85  
Propane  198808  220  27.03   17.56   48.7  3.95  37.52  0.14  0.52  9.41  
Natural Gas  199012  192  8.67   -5.63   54.5  0.55  3.74  0.10  0.42  -15.66  
Energies 
Coal  200207  53  -2.53   -4.05   17.6  0.33  2.61  0.17  0.49  -8.45   
Table 2: Inventories and Seasonality 
 
The table summarizes results from a regression of de-trended inventories on monthly dummies. De-trended inventories are defined as the percentage deviation from the normal level 
(i.e., 100 times log(I/I*) where I and I* are the levels of actual and normal inventories and log(I*) is the fitted value of applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the log of inventories.  The 
second column gives the start of the time series of inventories for each commodity; the end of the sample is December 2006. Subsequent columns give the estimated dummy 
coefficients, and the R-squared of the regression. The final column gives the first-order autocorrelation of monthly de-trended inventories 
 
Coefficients of Monthly Dummies  Commodity 
Group 
Commodity 
Name  Start  N 
Jan  Feb  March  Apr  May  June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec 
R-sq  rho 
Copper  196912  445  0.049  0.024  -0.064  -0.045  -0.053  -0.103  -0.064  0.045  0.089  0.044  0.036  0.042  0.01  0.98 
Platinum  199510  135  -0.064  -0.104  -0.056  -0.035  -0.133  -0.157  0.193  0.181  0.208  0.027  -0.031  -0.026  0.05  0.86 
Palladium  199510  135  -0.053  0.094  0.140  -0.094  -0.057  -0.018  -0.163  -0.172  0.023  -0.021  -0.019  0.316  0.01  0.94 
Zinc  196912  445  0.007  -0.010  -0.021  0.004  0.012  -0.001  -0.007  0.033  0.045  0.009  -0.029  -0.041  0.00  0.97 
Lead  196912  445  -0.007  -0.019  -0.040  -0.031  -0.027  0.021  0.044  0.033  0.047  0.023  0.002  -0.045  0.00  0.97 
Nickel  198004  321  0.104  0.028  0.002  0.055  0.081  -0.041  -0.087  -0.096  -0.028  -0.054  -0.031  0.070  0.00  0.96 
Aluminum  197912  325  0.050  0.033  0.015  0.002  -0.029  -0.023  -0.042  -0.023  -0.005  -0.008  0.034  -0.002  0.00  0.98 
Metals 
Tin  199006  199  0.079  0.020  0.019  -0.013  -0.044  -0.070  -0.050  0.008  -0.010  -0.037  -0.001  0.103  0.01  0.95 
Cotton  198912  205  -0.038  0.207  0.347  0.344  0.283  0.163  0.079  -0.456  -0.572  -0.341  -0.088  0.067  0.12  0.81 
Cocoa  196912  445  -0.094  -0.062  0.000  0.056  0.143  0.159  0.197  0.098  0.025  -0.161  -0.231  -0.126  0.04  0.94 
OJ  196912  445  -0.018  0.103  0.117  0.187  0.268  0.249  0.154  0.019  -0.141  -0.293  -0.378  -0.259  0.49  0.92 
Lumber  196912  445  0.000  0.013  0.018  0.014  -0.009  -0.009  -0.014  -0.014  -0.002  0.007  -0.006  0.001  0.01  0.90 
Softs 
Coffee  198301  288  -0.104  -0.099  0.065  -0.007  0.132  0.116  0.162  0.105  0.074  -0.164  -0.283  0.003  0.01  0.96 
Wheat  197006  439  -0.005  -0.093  -0.179  -0.312  -0.419  -0.193  0.114  0.260  0.305  0.263  0.164  0.069  0.34  0.96 
Corn  197406  391  0.300  0.273  0.233  0.126  -0.070  -0.248  -0.397  -0.489  -0.342  0.065  0.290  0.284  0.42  0.91 
Soybeans  196912  445  0.372  0.316  0.252  0.116  -0.067  -0.246  -0.473  -0.796  -0.848  0.378  0.526  0.459  0.61  0.76 
Soybean Oil  197009  436  0.063  0.067  0.074  0.079  0.072  0.034  0.017  -0.052  -0.138  -0.133  -0.080  0.007  0.07  0.97 
Soybean Meal  197009  436  0.050  0.034  0.019  0.047  0.082  -0.021  0.034  -0.142  -0.184  -0.025  0.061  0.049  0.07  0.71 
Grains 
Oats  197406  391  0.086  0.026  -0.036  -0.126  -0.266  -0.321  -0.237  0.013  0.213  0.270  0.216  0.154  0.12  0.94 
Pork Bellies  196912  445  0.207  0.239  0.438  0.572  0.618  0.489  0.054  -0.646  -1.211  -0.825  -0.150  0.209  0.70  0.87 
Live Cattle  196912  445  0.078  0.042  0.035  0.012  -0.030  -0.053  -0.052  -0.058  -0.044  -0.012  0.020  0.060  0.09  0.92 
Lean Hogs  196912  445  0.007  0.030  0.078  0.173  0.166  0.075  -0.045  -0.168  -0.163  -0.086  -0.030  -0.036  0.30  0.91 
Feeder Cattle  196912  445  0.013  -0.030  -0.053  -0.052  -0.058  -0.044  -0.012  0.020  0.061  0.078  0.041  0.035  0.09  0.92 
Milk  197001  444  -0.069  -0.044  -0.029  0.025  0.090  0.121  0.133  0.083  0.016  -0.050  -0.137  -0.139  0.28  0.95 
Meats 
Butter  197001  444  -0.133  0.005  0.052  0.185  0.291  0.261  0.252  0.134  -0.026  -0.143  -0.409  -0.467  0.23  0.91 
Heating Oil  196912  445  0.020  -0.094  -0.195  -0.210  -0.149  -0.077  0.026  0.091  0.137  0.149  0.171  0.129  0.50  0.92 
Crude Oil  196912  445  -0.015  -0.012  0.010  0.026  0.031  0.017  0.004  -0.011  -0.025  -0.001  0.001  -0.023  0.07  0.94 
Gasoline  196912  445  0.055  0.059  0.024  0.006  0.002  -0.008  -0.018  -0.044  -0.020  -0.039  -0.015  -0.001  0.26  0.85 
Propane  197101  432  -0.178  -0.347  -0.368  -0.248  -0.075  0.059  0.166  0.232  0.263  0.243  0.199  0.055  0.66  0.90 
Natural Gas  197509  376  -0.104  -0.343  -0.473  -0.386  -0.193  -0.025  0.107  0.215  0.311  0.362  0.325  0.167  0.79  0.91 
Energies 
Coal  199903  94  -0.049  -0.045  -0.002  0.045  0.067  0.059  0.014  -0.028  -0.044  -0.020  0.001  -0.008  0.17  0.94  
Table 3: Futures Basis and Inventories 
 
The table reports the results of a regression of the futures basis (measured as the percentage difference between the nearest and next-to-
maturity futures contracts and expressed as a percent per annum) on I/I* (the ratio of actual to normal inventory level) and monthly 
dummies, using a cubic spline regression.  The sample period for each commodity is the same as in Table 1.  The basis is defined as the 
annualized difference between the nearest to maturity futures price and the next futures price. Columns 2 to 5 report the slope and 
associated t-statistics of the regression at I/I* = 1 and I/I* = 0.75. The next two columns report the difference in the slopes and a t-value 
for the difference.  The standard errors of the coefficient estimates used for calculating the t-values are calculated using the Newey-West 
method for correcting error serial correlation with a bandwidth of 12 months.  The estimates reported for each commodity group are the 
slope and t-values when the coefficients of the cubic spline regression are estimated by pooled OLS, which constrains coefficients to be 
the same across commodities of the same group.  The standard errors of the pooled OLS coefficient estimates take into account serial and 
cross-sectional correlation in the error terms, and the fact that the data is an unbalanced panel, i.e., the starting month differs across 
commodities.    
 
Commodity  slope at 1  t  slope at 0.75  t  difference  t  R-sq 
Metals group  -5.1  -2.46  -11.8  -6.01  6.7  4.70    
Copper  -3.2  -0.61  -15.3  -2.76  12.1  5.64  0.41 
Platinum  -3.4  -1.10  -3.1  -0.93  -0.3  -0.12  0.41 
Palladium  -4.5  -1.46  -3.2  -1.26  -1.3  -1.03  0.19 
Zinc  -1.9  -0.39  -9.6  -2.22  7.6  3.32  0.32 
Lead  -14.6  -2.83  -27.0  -5.57  12.4  4.34  0.54 
Nickel  -3.9  -1.06  -13.6  -4.13  9.6  5.95  0.55 
Aluminum  -5.7  -1.64  -9.4  -2.86  3.7  2.16  0.25 
Tin  -0.1  -0.02  -9.3  -3.03  9.2  5.06  0.40 
Softs group  -19.3  -5.65  -25.7  -8.37  6.4  4.93    
Cotton  -16.6  -2.62  -24.4  -3.86  7.8  3.51  0.30 
Cocoa  -17.1  -2.47  -27.3  -3.47  10.2  3.30  0.31 
OJ  -38.9  -3.74  -34.7  -2.75  -4.3  -0.45  0.25 
Lumber  -109.1  -2.33  -546.6  -1.97  437.5  1.42  0.33 
Coffee  -9.2  -2.17  -16.2  -4.45  7.0  4.98  0.62 
Grains group  -21.4  -5.10  -25.1  -5.02  3.7  1.39    
Wheat  -28.7  -3.10  -45.3  -3.48  16.5  1.78  0.28 
Corn  -7.2  -0.93  -20.0  -1.91  12.8  1.61  0.31 
Soybeans  -24.9  -4.06  -33.1  -4.46  8.2  2.47  0.27 
Soybean Oil  -52.1  -3.74  -71.6  -3.75  19.5  1.05  0.29 
Soybean Meal  3.5  0.31  18.6  1.29  -15.0  -1.03  0.16 
Oats  -12.6  -1.14  -15.5  -1.25  2.9  0.45  0.18 
Meats group  -59.8  -7.03  -60.2  -6.27  0.4  0.12    
Pork Bellies  -35.8  -5.94  -39.2  -5.31  3.4  1.17  0.46 
Live Cattle  -43.4  -2.34  -9.3  -0.16  -34.1  -0.51  0.18 
Lean Hogs  -122.3  -5.34  -64.4  -1.24  -57.9  -0.91  0.62 
Feeder Cattle  -14.2  -0.92  -27.8  -0.61  13.7  0.26  0.16 
Milk  -63.8  -0.64  -829.9  -2.08  766.1  1.67  0.43 
Butter  -51.7  -3.74  -47.2  -2.99  -4.5  -0.54  0.35 
Energies group  -154.6  -7.61  -149.6  -4.15  -5.0  -0.16    
Heating Oil  -137.6  -6.03  -99.3  -1.18  -38.2  -0.40  0.59 
Crude Oil  -303.9  -6.06  1688.8  0.90  -1992.8  -1.05  0.46 
Gasoline  -359.6  -4.11  -1752.7  -0.40  1393.1  0.32  0.50 
Propane  -141.0  -5.21  -144.6  -4.61  3.6  0.13  0.56 
Natural Gas  -174.9  -2.94  -122.4  -1.93  -52.5  -0.85  0.55 
Coal  -64.9  -1.63  -210.8  -0.15  145.9  0.10  0.45  
Table 4: Commodity Excess Return and Inventories 
 
The table reports the results of a regression of monthly percentage excess futures returns on de-trended inventories at the start of the 
month, in addition to monthly dummies. De-trended inventories are defined as I/I*, the ratio of actual to normal inventory levels. Normal 
inventories are defined as the fitted values of applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to inventories. The standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates used for calculating the t-values are calculated using the Newey-West method for correcting error serial correlation with a 
bandwidth of 12 months.  The estimates reported for each commodity group are the coefficient and t-statistics when coefficients are 
constrained to be the same.   
 
Commodity  Coefficient of 
I/I*  t  R-sq 
Metals group  -0.040  -0.09    
Copper  -0.421  -0.85  0.03 
Platinum  -1.071  -1.15  0.10 
Palladium  0.767  1.03  0.08 
Zinc  -0.398  -0.76  0.04 
Lead  -0.504  -0.62  0.03 
Nickel  -0.160  -0.28  0.03 
Aluminum  0.542  1.58  0.05 
Tin  0.779  0.94  0.08 
Softs group  -0.240  -0.64    
Cotton  -0.933  -1.42  0.04 
Cocoa  -0.345  -0.46  0.03 
OJ  -3.347  -1.73  0.06 
Lumber  -11.839  -2.52  0.08 
Coffee  -0.029  -0.08  0.05 
Grains group  -0.773  -1.43    
Wheat  -1.850  -1.47  0.03 
Corn  0.444  0.37  0.02 
Soybeans  -0.333  -0.29  0.02 
Soybean Oil  -1.474  -0.79  0.02 
Soybean Meal  -0.687  -0.43  0.02 
Oats  -0.751  -0.86  0.01 
Meats group  -2.819  -2.22    
Pork Bellies  -2.256  -1.98  0.05 
Live Cattle  -2.131  -1.20  0.01 
Lean Hogs  -4.262  -2.13  0.05 
Feeder Cattle  -3.172  -1.84  0.03 
Milk  -11.810  -1.57  0.09 
Butter  -3.290  -1.19  0.06 
Energies group  -8.706  -1.75    
Heating Oil  -6.608  -1.65  0.08 
Crude Oil  -7.152  -0.60  0.06 
Gasoline  -4.005  -0.24  0.09 
Propane  -10.921  -1.78  0.09 
Natural Gas  -10.215  -1.17  0.04 
Coal  -8.052  -0.52  0.25 
 
   
Table 5: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on the Inventories 
 
At the end of each month the available commodities are ranked from high to low using normalized inventories, defined as ratio of the actual level of inventories 
(I) divided by the normal level of inventories  (I*). The top half of the commodities are assigned to the High inventory portfolio and the bottom half to the Low 
inventory portfolio. Panel A of the table summarizes the annualized return distributions of the High and Low portfolios in excess of the equally-weighted (EW) 
index. Average returns and standard deviations are expressed as percent per annum. The bottom panel summarizes information about the average characteristics 
of the commodities in the High and Low portfolios, as well as the Positions of Traders as defined by the CFTC. Characteristics include: the 12-month futures 
return prior to portfolio formation, the 12-month prior % change in spot price prior to portfolio formation, the percentage basis, and the normalized inventories 
expressed as percentage difference between actual inventory level (I) and normal inventory level (I*) (defined as 100 times log(I/I*)), and volatility defined as 
the % standard deviation of the daily commodity futures returns during the month for which the excess return is calculated. Positions of Traders are measures as a 
percent of Open Interest at the time of sorting. The columns measure the characteristics of the commodities in the High portfolio, the Low portfolio, and the t-
statistic for the difference.  
 
1969/12-2006/12 1986/1-2006/12 1990/12-2006/12
Panel A: Returns Relative to EW Index
High Low H-L High Low H-L High Low H-L
Mean -3.85 4.21 -8.06 -3.64 3.61 -7.25 -4.38 4.37 -8.75
Standard Deviation 7.77 7.80 15.48 7.03 7.04 14.02 6.44 6.47 12.84
t-statistic (mean) -3.03 3.32 -3.19 -2.34 2.33 -2.34 -2.83 2.80 -2.82
% Excess Return>0 42.57 56.53 43.47 41.04 57.37 42.23 41.67 57.29 43.23
Panel B: Average Portfolio Characteristics
High Low t-stat High Low t-stat High Low t-stat
Prior 12m futures return 0.41 15.31 -6.45 1.24 12.97 -5.54 0.05 11.20 -5.43
Prior 12m spot return 6.00 9.78 -2.58 5.00 8.85 -2.39 5.33 8.59 -1.95
Basis -7.78 4.61 -14.51 -6.86 4.51 -11.40 -8.81 2.79 -13.14
Inventories 36.37 -36.15 37.20 -35.19 40.80 -31.07
Volatility (+1) 23.40 23.86 -1.15 23.75 23.90 -0.27 23.84 23.46 0.66
Commercials -11.71 -7.97 -5.03 -12.33 -8.00 -4.81
Non-Commercials 5.59 5.28 0.58 6.01 5.66 0.53
Non Reportable 6.08 2.75 5.29 6.27 2.41 5.23   
Table 6: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on the Futures Basis 
 
At the end of each month the available commodities are ranked from high to low using the futures basis, defined as the annualized percentage difference between 
the nearest and next futures price. The top half of the commodities are assigned to the High Basis portfolio and the bottom half to the Low Basis portfolio. Panel 
A of the table summarizes the annualized return distributions of the High and Low portfolios in excess of the equally-weighted (EW) index. Average returns and 
standard deviations are expressed as percent per annum. The bottom panel summarizes information about the average characteristics of the commodities in the 
High and Low portfolios, as well as the Positions of Traders as defined by the CFTC. Characteristics include: the 12-month futures return prior to portfolio 
formation, the 12-month prior % change in spot price prior to portfolio formation, the percentage basis, and the normalized inventories expressed as percentage 
difference between actual inventory level (I) and normal inventory level (I*) (defined as 100 times log(I/I*)), and volatility defined as the % standard deviation of 
the daily commodity futures returns during the month for which the excess return is calculated. Positions of Traders are measures as a percent of Open Interest at 
the time of sorting. The columns measure the characteristics of the commodities in the High portfolio, the Low portfolio, and the t-statistic for the difference.  
 
1969/12-2006/12 1986/1-2006/12 1990/12-2006/12
Panel A: Returns Relative to EW Index
High Low H-L High Low H-L High Low H-L
Mean 5.42 -4.82 10.23 5.04 -4.70 9.74 5.71 -5.86 11.57
Standard Deviation 7.76 7.93 15.58 6.87 7.13 13.93 6.08 6.08 12.10
t-statistic (mean) 3.98 -3.44 3.73 3.55 -3.14 3.36 4.04 -4.10 4.08
% Excess Return>0 58.56 42.79 57.88 61.35 39.04 61.35 63.02 37.50 63.02
Panel B: Average Portfolio Characteristics
High Low t-stat High Low t-stat High Low t-stat
Prior 12m futures return 21.02 -5.11 12.93 19.68 -5.40 12.99 17.50 -5.93 10.56
Prior 12m spot return 15.61 0.29 10.45 14.39 -0.51 9.51 14.11 0.00 7.16
Basis 15.32 -18.40 15.44 -17.73 13.04 -19.01
Inventories -14.87 15.31 -17.08 -13.78 15.95 -13.65 -9.34 19.09 -13.76
Volatility (+1) 24.07 23.23 2.13 24.30 23.31 1.72 23.98 23.30 0.99
Commercials -8.94 -10.34 1.46 -9.87 -10.01 0.13
Non-Commercials 6.89 3.95 4.24 7.78 3.92 4.81
Non Reportable 2.38 6.12 -7.00 2.52 5.73 -5.99   
Table 7: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on the Prior 12-month Futures Return 
 
At the end of each month the available commodities are ranked from high to low using prior 12-month futures return. The top half of the commodities are 
assigned to the High momentum portfolio and the bottom half to the Low Momentum portfolio. Panel A of the table summarizes the annualized return 
distributions of the High and Low portfolios in excess of the equally-weighted (EW) index. Average returns and standard deviations are expressed as percent per 
annum. The bottom panel summarizes information about the average characteristics of the commodities in the High and Low portfolios, as well as the Positions 
of Traders as defined by the CFTC. Characteristics include: the 12-month futures return prior to portfolio formation, the 12-month prior % change in spot price 
prior to portfolio formation, the percentage basis, and the normalized inventories expressed as percentage difference between actual inventory level (I) and 
normal inventory level (I*) (defined as 100 times log(I/I*)), and volatility defined as the % standard deviation of the daily commodity futures returns during the 
month for which the excess return is calculated. Positions of Traders are measures as a percent of Open Interest at the time of sorting. The columns measure the 
characteristics of the commodities in the High portfolio, the Low portfolio, and the t-statistic for the difference.  
 
1969/12-2006/12 1986/1-2006/12 1990/12-2006/12
Panel A: Returns Relative to EW Index
High Low H-L High Low H-L High Low H-L
Mean 6.54 -6.82 13.36 6.81 -7.03 13.84 7.69 -7.67 15.36
Standard Deviation 8.52 8.62 16.99 7.80 7.90 15.53 6.84 6.83 13.64
t-statistic (mean) 4.82 -4.95 4.93 4.24 -4.35 4.34 4.56 -4.62 4.60
% Excess Return>0 58.78 42.34 58.11 61.35 39.44 60.96 64.58 35.42 64.58
Panel B: Average Portfolio Characteristics
High Low t-stat High Low t-stat High Low t-stat
Prior 12m futures return 32.62 -16.65 31.57 -17.14 29.40 -17.79
Prior 12m spot return 26.22 -10.43 23.52 25.54 -11.70 24.16 25.37 -11.23 20.33
Basis 6.73 -9.96 19.15 6.94 -9.30 17.97 5.03 -11.08 14.73
Inventories -9.30 9.88 -8.26 -7.29 9.44 -6.07 -3.51 13.29 -5.74
Volatility (+1) 24.10 23.28 1.71 24.43 23.24 1.83 24.37 22.97 1.83
Commercials -11.57 -8.01 -2.73 -12.53 -7.46 -3.61
Non-Commercials 9.02 1.58 9.81 10.11 1.24 11.72
Non Reportable 2.74 6.18 -4.31 2.67 5.89 -3.67   
Table 8: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on the Prior 12-month Spot Return 
 
At the end of each month the available commodities are ranked from high to low using prior 12-month spot return, defined as the percentage change in the spot 
price. The top half of the commodities are assigned to the High momentum portfolio and the bottom half to the Low Momentum portfolio.  Panel A of the table 
summarizes the annualized return distributions of the High and Low portfolios in excess of the equally-weighted (EW) index. Average returns and standard 
deviations are expressed as percent per annum. The bottom panel summarizes information about the average characteristics of the commodities in the High and 
Low portfolios, as well as the Positions of Traders as defined by the CFTC. Characteristics include: the 12-month futures return prior to portfolio formation, the 
12-month prior % change in spot price prior to portfolio formation, the percentage basis, and the normalized inventories expressed as percentage difference 
between actual inventory level (I) and normal inventory level (I*) (defined as 100 times log(I/I*)), and volatility defined as the % standard deviation of the daily 
commodity futures returns during the month for which the excess return is calculated. Positions of Traders are measures as a percent of Open Interest at the time 
of sorting. The columns measure the characteristics of the commodities in the High portfolio, the Low portfolio, and the t-statistic for the difference.  
 
1969/12-2006/12 1986/1-2006/12 1990/12-2006/12
Panel A: Returns Relative to EW Index
High Low H-L High Low H-L High Low H-L
Mean 6.73 -7.12 13.85 8.55 -8.82 17.37 7.87 -8.16 16.03
Standard Deviation 8.69 8.58 17.19 8.53 8.34 16.83 6.71 6.78 13.44
t-statistic (mean) 4.77 -5.09 4.95 4.79 -5.07 4.94 4.36 -4.55 4.47
% Excess Return>0 56.76 41.67 57.88 59.76 38.25 60.96 61.46 36.98 61.98
Panel B: Average Portfolio Characteristics
High Low t-stat High Low t-stat High Low t-stat
Prior 12m futures return 28.61 -12.79 18.13 27.98 -13.58 22.84 25.99 -14.41 20.56
Prior 12m spot return 29.78 -13.87 28.60 -14.67 28.15 -14.01
Basis 3.94 -7.08 11.57 4.71 -7.05 12.40 3.00 -9.00 10.22
Inventories -3.00 3.27 -2.77 -2.25 4.09 -2.51 1.56 8.17 -2.57
Volatility (+1) 24.18 23.25 1.82 24.35 23.33 1.40 24.43 22.90 1.91
Commercials -13.02 -6.45 -6.29 -14.03 -5.83 -7.80
Non-Commercials 9.60 1.14 13.68 10.59 0.95 16.12
Non Reportable 3.68 5.04 -1.87 3.78 4.53 -0.93 
Table 9: Summary of Positions of Traders 1986 – 2006 
 
The table summarizes the Positions of Traders in commodity futures markets according to the classifications employed in the Commitment of Traders Report 
published by the CFTC: For each category (Commercials, Non-Commercials, and Non-Reportables) positions are measured as net long and expressed as a 
percentage of Open Interest. The columns report the sample average position, the standard deviation of the position, the fraction of the months the position is 
long, and the first-order autocorrelation (rho) of the position. 
 
Net Long Positions of Traders as Percent of Open Interest
Commercials Non-Commercials Non Reportable
Commodity Average Stdev %Long rho Average Stdev %Long rho Average Stdev %Long rho
Metals Copper -16.67 22.70 26.19 0.76 8.28 17.01 67.86 0.74 8.39 8.42 85.32 0.81
Platinum -38.93 24.02 7.14 0.71 23.99 22.00 83.73 0.74 14.94 7.83 97.62 0.79
Palladium -30.48 30.15 22.62 0.92 17.33 18.70 76.59 0.88 13.15 14.72 82.14 0.92
Softs Cotton -4.02 23.11 42.06 0.71 -1.41 19.93 49.60 0.73 5.42 6.32 83.73 0.76
Cocoa -8.77 16.14 28.97 0.78 2.40 12.61 56.35 0.74 6.38 5.74 89.29 0.88
Sugar -20.72 21.66 22.62 0.73 9.43 14.85 72.22 0.72 11.30 9.04 90.08 0.77
Orange Juice -15.06 25.57 26.19 0.77 6.38 17.41 64.29 0.70 8.68 13.65 83.73 0.86
Lumber -10.50 18.62 32.14 0.74 4.57 15.21 66.67 0.62 5.93 12.00 69.84 0.74
Coffee -17.41 15.38 16.67 0.59 6.49 13.65 69.84 0.56 10.92 4.76 100.00 0.76
Grains Wheat -9.35 15.77 30.95 0.73 4.60 12.74 59.52 0.73 4.75 8.54 68.25 0.80
Corn 1.01 13.81 51.59 0.76 5.69 10.97 66.27 0.74 -6.70 5.97 11.11 0.83
Soybeans -10.73 17.61 27.38 0.87 6.67 12.68 70.24 0.80 4.06 7.68 68.65 0.89
Soybean Oil -13.11 18.28 28.97 0.74 5.17 12.94 63.49 0.75 7.94 7.23 87.70 0.72
Soybean Meal -13.72 14.89 21.43 0.70 4.67 10.25 67.06 0.70 9.04 5.85 94.05 0.69
Oats -37.15 15.92 1.19 0.71 11.95 11.51 90.87 0.77 25.20 13.49 98.02 0.82
Rough Rice -7.43 21.14 37.07 0.85 2.72 13.35 53.88 0.83 4.71 13.99 56.90 0.82
Meats Pork Bellies -0.84 14.41 43.65 0.76 -1.91 18.82 44.84 0.68 2.75 18.76 53.17 0.80
Live Cattle -8.31 11.34 26.98 0.85 8.05 10.25 75.40 0.73 0.26 10.21 48.02 0.88
Lean Hogs 0.59 12.02 46.83 0.68 5.81 14.47 66.67 0.64 -6.40 7.99 17.46 0.56
Feeder Cattle 8.79 11.90 75.00 0.75 8.86 12.96 76.19 0.70 -17.65 13.99 14.29 0.87
Milk 10.94 16.42 76.58 0.85 1.12 10.89 45.05 0.75 -12.06 8.83 4.50 0.75
Energies Heating Oil -9.00 9.75 18.65 0.61 1.80 6.26 59.92 0.55 7.20 5.41 90.87 0.72
Crude Oil -0.10 8.43 47.62 0.66 0.39 6.28 50.79 0.68 -0.29 3.39 46.83 0.58
Unleaded Gas -8.76 11.43 23.81 0.60 6.54 8.58 76.19 0.65 2.22 4.50 73.02 0.38
Propane -9.82 11.83 19.74 0.71 -0.61 6.08 28.29 0.71 10.43 10.35 82.24 0.65
Natural Gas -7.01 8.22 22.00 0.63 0.76 7.21 56.00 0.65 6.25 3.47 98.00 0.79 
Table 10: Hedging Pressure and Futures Returns 1986/12 – 2006/12 
 
The  table  summarizes  the  results  of  a  simple  regression  of  futures  returns  realized  at  the  end  of  month  t  on  Commercial  Positions  measured  at  time  t 
(contemporaneous) and measured at the end of month t-1 (lagged). Commercial Positions are defined as the net long position in a commodity future expressed as 
a percent of the Open Interest in that commodity using data obtained from the Report of Traders of the CFTC. The independent variable is measured in levels 
(left panel) and in first differences (right panel). The table reports the slope coefficient and the associated t-statistic, and the R-squared of the regression. 
 
Independent Variable Commercial Positions (Levels) Commercial Positions (First Differences)
Contemporaneous Lagged Contemporaneous Lagged
Commodity slope t-stat R-sq slope t-stat R-sq slope t-stat R-sq slope t-stat R-sq
Metals Copper -0.13 -4.95 0.13 -0.02 -0.91 0.00 -0.24 -8.22 0.20 -0.02 -0.58 0.00
Platinum -0.10 -7.49 0.16 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.16 -9.60 0.27 0.02 0.99 0.00
Palladium -0.06 -2.54 0.04 -0.03 -1.22 0.01 -0.18 -4.09 0.06 -0.06 -1.36 0.01
Softs Cotton -0.16 -8.82 0.22 -0.02 -1.15 0.01 -0.23 -9.85 0.28 0.00 0.04 0.00
Cocoa -0.15 -4.50 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.34 -7.99 0.20 0.02 0.48 0.00
Sugar -0.19 -7.24 0.18 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.34 -10.90 0.33 -0.02 -0.62 0.00
Orange Juice -0.07 -3.35 0.05 -0.02 -0.76 0.00 -0.13 -4.55 0.07 0.04 1.32 0.01
Lumber -0.11 -3.70 0.05 -0.03 -0.97 0.00 -0.15 -3.70 0.05 0.03 0.79 0.00
Coffee -0.31 -6.85 0.17 0.04 0.86 0.00 -0.42 -9.91 0.26 0.10 1.96 0.01
Grains Wheat -0.15 -6.12 0.15 0.01 0.49 0.00 -0.31 -10.68 0.31 0.02 0.68 0.00
Corn -0.23 -8.32 0.21 -0.01 -0.30 0.00 -0.46 -13.09 0.40 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Soybeans -0.10 -5.19 0.08 0.01 0.27 0.00 -0.41 -11.64 0.36 -0.02 -0.42 0.00
Soybean Oil -0.16 -8.31 0.18 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.31 -11.57 0.35 0.02 0.52 0.00
Soybean Meal -0.20 -7.40 0.17 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.33 -10.11 0.29 0.01 0.13 0.00
Oats -0.01 -0.23 0.00 0.09 2.17 0.02 -0.17 -3.21 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.00
Rough Rice -0.09 -3.49 0.05 -0.06 -2.43 0.02 -0.09 -2.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.78 0.00
Meats Pork Bellies 0.02 0.35 0.00 0.04 0.79 0.00 -0.05 -0.61 0.00 0.06 0.85 0.00
Live Cattle -0.09 -4.22 0.06 -0.03 -1.38 0.01 -0.19 -4.75 0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.00
Lean Hogs -0.19 -5.63 0.09 0.01 0.22 0.00 -0.30 -6.46 0.15 0.06 1.16 0.01
Feeder Cattle -0.03 -1.23 0.01 0.05 2.39 0.02 -0.16 -5.72 0.12 -0.02 -0.80 0.00
Milk -0.14 -2.41 0.08 -0.08 -1.23 0.02 -0.25 -2.57 0.06 -0.13 -1.30 0.02
Energies Heating Oil -0.46 -8.22 0.22 -0.05 -0.75 0.00 -0.51 -8.39 0.22 -0.07 -0.97 0.00
Crude Oil -0.49 -6.73 0.17 -0.12 -1.60 0.01 -0.51 -6.34 0.13 -0.07 -0.83 0.00
Unleaded Gas -0.35 -6.70 0.15 -0.05 -0.95 0.00 -0.36 -6.05 0.13 -0.10 -1.56 0.01
Propane 0.10 1.03 0.01 -0.12 -1.22 0.01 0.38 2.88 0.05 -0.23 -1.69 0.02
Natural Gas -0.77 -6.13 0.17 -0.10 -0.71 0.00 -0.90 -6.40 0.17 -0.14 -0.88 0.00   
Figure 1: Excess Returns and Basis 
 
The figure plots the sample average basis against the sample average futures excess return for individual commodity futures between 1990/12 and 2006/12. The 
basis is measured as the relative price difference between the two closest to maturity contracts, expressed as a percent per annum 
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Figure 2: Seasonal Variation of Inventories 
 
The figure graphs the fitted coefficients of a regression of log of inventories, measured in deviation from HP filtered inventories, on 
monthly dummies. Panel A plots the seasonal coefficients for Natural Gas Inventories, and Panel B shows the seasonal variation for 
inventories of Corn. 
 
Seasonal Variation of Natural Gas Inventories



























Seasonal Variation of Wheat Inventories



























Seasonal Variation of Corn Inventories



























Figure 3: Normalized Inventories and Characteristics 
For each commodity we divide the sample in months when actual relative to normalized inventories is above unity (High) and when it is below unity (Low). In 
Panel A, we plot for each commodity the average basis in High and Low inventory months, expressed in deviation from the full sample mean. In Panel B, we 
show for each commodity the prior 12-month futures returns in High and Low inventory months, expressed in deviation from the annualized sample average 
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Figure 4: Basis and Normalized Inventories 
 
The figure shows a scatter plot of the monthly observations of the futures basis against the ratio of inventories relative to trend (I/I*) 
for Copper and Crude Oil.  The basis is net of seasonal effect, i.e., after subtracting the estimated linear function of monthly 
dummies in the cubic spline regression.  In addition (in red) we give the fitted values of a cubic spline regression of the basis on 
inventories. 
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